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1.  Rudiger Dornbusch 
The United States has a major stake in the world debt problem because 
it affects the profitability and even the stability of our banking system. 
But it also matters because debt service requires trade surpluses for 
debtors. We  are now experiencing the reverse side of the coin from 
collecting debt: debtor countries, having made their goods extra com- 
petitive, are selling in our market and are competing with our exports. 
The debt problem is therefore a part, though perhaps a small part, of 
the U.S. trade crisis. Finally, we have a major foreign policy stake in 
the debt crisis because debt collection brings about social and political 
instability. 
This paper reviews these various aspects of the debt problem. Section 
3.1 sets out debt facts, followed in section 3.2 with a brief look at the 
origins of the debt problem. That issue is important in laying the ground- 
work for solutions that involve sharing the adjustment. The “transfer 
problem” in section 3.3 is the general framework in which we discuss 
the problem of debt service for the debtor countries. Section 3.4 deals 
with bank exposure and the quality of less developed countries’ (LDCs) 
debts. The U.S.  trade implications of  the debt crisis are briefly ad- 
dressed in section 3.5. The paper concludes with an overview of al- 
ternative proposals for solving the debt problem. 
3.1  Debt Facts 
In this section I provide an overview of  debt facts: in the aggregate 
and in country detail who owes whom how much, with what maturity, 
and in which currency. 
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3.1.1  An Overview 
Table 3.1 shows aggregate debt data for selected years both in current 
and constant dollars. There is a problem in finding a suitable deflator 
for the world economy. Possible candidates are the U.S. GNP deflator, 
or either import or export prices for LDCs. I select instead the price 
(export unit value) of industrial countries’ exports as a broader price 
index of  trends in the world economy. World trade prices since 1980 
have declined and even in 1986 are below their 1980 level. Accordingly, 
this index behaves very differently from, for example, the U.S.  deflator, 
which has been steadily increasing. 
Since 1978, LDC debt has increased by 142 percent in nominal terms 
and 88 percent in real terms. In these aggregate data we observe the 
slowdown of debt growth since 1982 and the effect of changing trends 
in  world prices with inflation in the early period and deflation since 
1980.2 
A second perspective is provided by looking at debt relative to some 
scale variables. The most common scale variables are exports of goods 
and services and GDP. Table 3.2 shows debt relative to GDP. 
The most interesting point made by this data is that differences, at 
least  at this aggregate level, are minor.  Latin  America  is  normally 
singled out as the problem case. But on a debt-income basis, non-oil 
Middle East countries stand out as carrying an even larger burden. The 
other point to note is the deterioration in debt ratios since 1982. This 
is surprising when one sees banks today rationing credit. The expla- 
nation lies primarily in the fact that GDP in U.S.  dollars has declined 
for most debtor countries as a result of large real depre~iation.~ 
There is another interesting presentation  of  debt-income ratios in 
singling out different groupings of  countries. Interestingly small, low- 
income countries have a higher debt-GDP ratio (64.0 percent) than net 
oil imports (35.3 percent) or the group of  problem debtors (46.6 per- 
Table 3.1  Capital-Importing LDC Debt (billions of U.S. dollars; billion 
1980 dollars) 
1986 
1978  1980  1982  1984  1986  %Share 
Total  399  570  763  849  967  100.0 
Africa  72  94  117  128  144  14.9 
Asia  93  135  180  212  265  27.4 
Europe  48  68  77  82  101  10.4 
Non-oil Middle East  30  43  56  68  75  7.8 
Western Hemisphere  156  23 I  333  359  383  37.5 
Total (1980 Prices)”  523  578  822  974  987  - 
Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook and IFS. 
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Table 3.2  Debt GDP Ratios (percentage) 
Non-Oil  Western 
Africa  Asia  Europe  Middle East  Hemisphere 
1978  32.2  15.9  23.7  52.9  31.8 
1982  36.3  21.5  30.8  66.6  43.5 
1986  44.3  30.0  40.0  63.2  47.0 
Cumulative Real 
GDP Growth, 
1982 -  86  4.2  31.1  11.4  -0.3  5.5 
~~ 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook. 
cent). Thus countries in a group with Afghanistan and Bangladesh have 
higher debt ratios than the group including Brazil and Mexico. We shall 
see below that this does not translate into higher debt burdens since 
much of  the poor countries’ debt is concessional. 
3.1.2  Short, Long, Official, and Private Debt 
The  maturity  structure  of  the  debt  is  primarily  medium  term. 
Throughout 1978-86,  the share of short-term debt (less than one-year 
maturity) in total debt of all capital-importing LDCs never exceeded 
20  percent. But, of  course, there are significant differences between 
countries. The larger the borrowing from commercial banks, the shorter 
the maturity of debt. In the period to 1982 there was an increase in the 
share of  short-term debt, reflecting the increasing recourse  to com- 
mercial bank financing. But since then, with rescheduling and increased 
official lending,  the  share of  short-term debt has  declined  from  20 
percent to only 13 percent. Since most debtors are not in a position to 
amortize their debts, the distinction between short- and long-term debt 
is becoming increasingly irrelevant. 
Table 3.3 shows the share of debt to official creditors in total debt. 
The table reports the data for various regions. 
The differences among country groupings in their funding is quite 
striking. Latin America stands out as borrowing a very much larger 
Table 3.3  Share of Long-Term Debt to Official Creditors in Total Debt 
(percentage of total) 
Non-Oil  Western 
Africa  Asia  Europe  Middle East  Hemisphere 
1978  34.0  54.9  27.6  57.6  15.9 
1982  38.9  42.5  30.7  58.5  12.4 
1986  48.6  43.5  33.3  58.5  20.3 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook. 164  Rudiger Dornbusch/Thomas  S. JohnsonIAnne 0.  Krueger 
share from private sources than the remaining countries. But there is 
also an interesting difference in behavior over time. For Latin America 
and Africa, the absolute and relative increase in official credit since 
1982 is  much  more  substantial than  for other regions.  In  1985, for 
example, commercial bank exposure declined in absolute terms, while 
official exposure, especially of multilateral agencies, increased. 
3.1.3  Debt Service Burdens 
The burden of  debt  service is made up of  interest payments  and 
amortization. As such it is affected by three factors: 
1. The maturity profile of debt, which dictates the amount of am- 
ortization in a given year. Any bunching of maturities would translate 
into large year-to-year fluctuations in debt service. 
2. Interest rates on the debt. This factor depends on the private- 
official composition of the debt. Official debt may be concessional and 
long term  while private debt typically  involves floating-rate interest 
payments. 
3. Debt service measured relative to some benchmark such as exports 
or GDP.  The benchmark is affected by the country’s real exchange 
rate.  Real  depreciation,  as already noted, will  reduce  real  GDP in 
dollars and hence raise the debt-income ratio. Measuring debt relative 
to exports implies that changes in the value of exports, say as a result 
of exchange rate policy or as a consequence of changes in world com- 
modity prices, will affect the debt-export ratio. 
The distinction between long- and short-term debt, in an environment 
of universal rescheduling, is becoming uninteresting. I thus focus only 
on interest payments. Table 3.4 shows debt service measured by  in- 
terest payments as a fraction of debt, GDP, and exports. I again focus 
on the geographical distribution. 
The first row makes apparent the difference in effective interest rates 
paid. Africa and Asia have a significantly larger share of concessional 
loans, and, accordingly, interest payments as a fraction of debt are in 
excess of  two percentage points  less than for Latin America. As  a 
benchmark we can compare the effective interest rate with the LIBOR 
Table 3.4  LDC Interest Payments, 1986 
Non-Oil  Western 
Africa  Asia  Europe  Middle East  Hemisphere 
Percent of Debt  6.8  5.8  8.0  7.3  8.4 
Percent of GDP  3.0  1.7  3.2  4.6  3.9 
Percent of Exports  14.4  6.1  10.8  17.0  27.7 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook. 165  Our LDC Debts 
(London Interbank Offered Rate), which in 1985-86 averaged 7.8 per- 
cent. Divergences of the effective rate from LIBOR reflect concessional 
loans and the spreads above LIBOR on commercial bank loans. 
The interest burden as a fraction of GDP shows Africa and Europe 
in the middle range, a low figure for Asia, and a high indebtedness for 
Latin America and the non-oil Middle East. Differences between the 
GDP and export-based comparisons reflect economic structure. Europe 
is wide open while Latin America is much more closed. Latin America’s 
export-to-GDP ratio is much lower than that for Asia, for example. 
The difference  between  debtors  with  commercial as opposed  to 
concessional debt becomes particularly apparent when comparing ef- 
fective interest payments. While the effective interest rate for small, 
low-income countries in 1986 averaged 3.4 percent, for the remaining 
groups it was between 6.9 percent and 8.7 percent. 
3.1.4  Currency Denomination 
The currency  composition  of  lending to LDCs is  not  well  docu- 
mented. There is litle doubt that the major part of loans, perhaps 60 
percent to 70 percent, is in U.S.  dollars. The denomination  issue is 
very important since large fluctuations of real exchange rates between 
the United States, Europe, and Japan involve changing burdens of real 
debt and changing bank exposure. 
Since February  1985  the dollar has declined in world markets by 
more than 50 percent relative to key currencies. Over the same period, 
prices of industrial countries’ exports, which we might use as an index 
of  prices  in  world trade, have fallen only 5 percent  while prices of 
commodities exported by LDCs fell 7 percent over 1982-86. The move- 
ment of the dollar thus did not carry significant consequences for debtor 
countries if  they were entirely denominated in dollars. If, however, a 
significant part was denominated in yen or in European currencies, the 
vast exchange rate movements would have meant an increase in real 
debt  burden^.^ 
3.1.5  Major Problem Debtors 
We  conclude the review  of facts with a listing of  major problem 
debtors.  This group of  countries  corresponds to the fifteen heavily 
indebted countries  shown in  Table 3.5, along with their total debts, 
interest payments, and debt per capita. 
In this table, Chile, Peru, and Bolivia are shown as having the highest 
debt-GDP ratio, while Chile, Argentina, and Mexico show the highest 
per capita debt figures. Bolivia and Morocco are interesting in that their 
debts are predominantly to official creditors. Finally, Nigeria is of in- 
terest because of the relatively low per capita debt by comparison with 
the other countries. 166  Rudiger Dornbusch/Thomas S. Johnson/Anne 0.  Krueger 
Table 3.5  Fifteen Heavily Indebted Countries 
Debt  Interest-GDP  Share of  Debt 
Country  Debt”  Per Capitab  Ratio’  to Private Creditors 
Argentina 
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Sources: Fortune, December 23,  1985; Economist, September 27,  1986; International 
Financial Statistics; and World Bank 1986. 
aBillions of U.S. dollars. 
bThousands of  U.S. dollars. 
=Interest payments on the external debt as a percentage of GDP. 
3.2  The Origins of the Debt Problem 
In this section we review the origins of the debt problem. Three facts 
combined to produce the debt crisis of 1982. The proportions vary from 
one case to another, but in almost all instances there is a combination 
of  the following factors: (1) poor macroeconomic policies of  debtor 
countries, including overvaluation of their currencies; (2) the downturn 
in the world economy, involving sharply higher interest rates and lower 
growth; (3) initial overlending and subsequent credit denial by  com- 
mercial banks. 
3.2.1  Domestic Mismanagement 
In the late 1970s, debtor countries worldwide, with rare exceptions, 
embarked on policies inducing currency overvaluation. The policies 
were motivated by a single purpose: to contain and reduce stubborn 
inflationary pressure. The popularity of  the policy, in the short term, 
stems from the fact that real wages increase. The increase in real wages 
translates  only gradually  into lower  employment. Hence there is  a 
period of euphoria as standards of living are artificially inflated by the 
real appreciation while the resulting external imbalance is financed via 
reserve depletion and external borrowing. 
Each of the countries in table 3.6 showed some real appreciation in 
1979-82,  indicated by an increase in the real exchange rate index. For 167  Our LDC Debts 
Table 3.6  Real Exchange Rates (index 1980-82  = 100) 
Argentina  Brazil  Chile  Mexico  Venezuela  Korea 
1976-78  73  116  75  98  95  92 
1979  101  96  79  98  94  95 
1980  116  85  95  104  93  96 
1981  107  103  108  114  100  101 
1982  76  112  97  82  110  103 
1983  -85  74  85  86  86  98  96 
Source: Morgan Guaranty World Financial Markets. 
example, in Argentina the real exchange rate moves from a value of 
73 in  1976-78  to 116 in  1980. Not all cases were as extreme, and the 
annual averages conceal some of the even higher peaks. But the basic 
point is that most debtor countries, sometime in 1979-82, experienced 
real appreciation of some degree. 
The exact timing of real appreciation differs but the story is invariably 
the same. There are, however, significant differences in the magnitude 
of overvaluation. Argentina, Chile, Mexico, and Venezuela had much 
more extreme experiences than Brazil or Korea. Brazil is interesting 
because its policy of  using (normally) a crawling peg geared to the 
United States-Brazil  economywide inflation differentials assured that 
high-productivity growth in tradables translated into a steady real de- 
preciation. Dollar depreciation reinforced the gain in competitiveness 
in  the late  1970s, but  when  the dollar strengthened in  the  1980-82 
period, competitiveness was lost. In Korea’s case the real appreciation 
was very short lived and in fact quite minor compared to, say, Argentina. 
The particular details of mismanagement differ between countries. 
For example, we look at Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico. 
Argentina 
Under Finance Minister Martinez de Hoz in the post-Peronist mili- 
tary government, inflation was reduced from more than 600 percent in 
1976 to less than 200 percent by 1978. But further inflation reduction 
was hard to achieve. A large budget deficit was an obvious reason, yet 
the government preferred to focus on the inflation-depreciation spiral 
and the role of expectations. 
Appealing to the law of one price, and the critical role of expectations, 
the government implemented  in December  1978 a policy  of  prean- 
nouncing the rate-of-exchange depreciation. The preannounced tablita 
showed a steady deceleration of the rate of depreciation, and this was 
actually implemented. But inflation reduction was very slow, hence the 
real exchange rate became steadily o~ervalued.~  Even so the policy 
was continued until March 1981 when it ultimately broke down. 
The consequences for debt of overvaluation came primarily from the 
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ital flows entirely. As a result, residents, aware of the growing over- 
valuation, could freely shift into foreign assets ranging from dollar bills 
to foreign deposits and securities or real estate. The extreme overval- 
uation, reaching more than 40 percent, led to large-scale capital flight. 
The government borrowed in New York, using the proceeds to sustain 
the  exchange rate  along its  preannounced  path.  The public  bought 
dollars and redeposited them in  the very same banks from which the 
government had borrowed. And that process continued, in the fullest 
knowledge of all concerned, until a change in the military government 
led to a collapse of the policy. 
My estimate of Argentine capital flight in 1978-82 is $23 billion, not 
counting unrepatriated interest earnings which would raise the figure 
to well above $30 billion. 
Chile 
The Pinochet government instituted free market reforms and fiscal 
orthodoxy in  Chile. These included elimination of tariffs and quotas 
and a balancing of  the budget.6 But inflation, while sharply reduced 
from the near hyperinflation levels of  1972-74,  would not disappear. 
By  1979, with inflation the only major economic problem, the govern- 
ment fixed the exchange rate. The rate was fixed at 39 pesos/$ even 
though inflation was still near 30 percent, way above world inflation, 
and wages were indexed in a backward-looking fashion. 
Not surprisingly, the exchange rate became increasingly overvalued. 
Wage increases far outpaced world inflation and thus the real exchange 
rate appreciated steadily. In the short run the policy was popular since 
it raised living standards. But it became increasingly apparent that an 
unsustainable  overvaluation was accumulating.  By  198 1 the  system 
started to unravel.  The public  responded  in  their accustomed  way. 
Taking advantage of what was perceived to be a very transitory “sale” 
of imports, the entire country participated in the flight into imports (in 
particular durables). 
The real exchange rate appreciated by more than 25 percent between 
1978 and 1981. The value of imports increased by 50 percent. Import 
volume indexes tell an extraordinary story: breeding stock  +  328 per- 
cent, automobiles  +  226  percent, electro domestic equipment  + 156 
percent. The Chilean example highlights that, especially in the case of 
producer and consumer durables, a transitory exchange rate overval- 
uation has major effects on the timing of purchases. The government 
was not deterred by these developments. Steadfastly, the authorities 
maintained the exchange rate and asserted that the exchange rate policy 
was visibly successful as evidenced by the declining rate of inflation. 
As in all other cases, the policy ultimately broke down. Tariffs are 
back today and so are quotas. Inflation is back to the point where the 169  Our LDC Debts 
adventure started. The lasting difference is an extraordinary debt bur- 
den and extremely high unemployment. We  return to these issues below. 
Mexico 
The large increase in oil prices during  1978-79  would lead one to 
expect  that  Mexico  should  have done well.  But  even with  sharply 
increased revenues from oil, the current account deteriorated in 1979- 
81 from $5 billion to $13 billion. At the same time there was a major 
outflow of capital.’ 
An estimate by Morgan Guaranty places the amount of capital flight 
during 1976-&2 at $36 billion while a World Bank estimate for 1979- 
82 gives $26.5 billion  (World Financial  Markets, March  1986; World 
Development Report, 1986). The extent of  capital flight is associated 
with a peculiarly Mexican institution: the sixth and final year of the 
presidency. Such a year was 1982, and people expected, correctly, that 
overvaluation and an excess of  spending would ultimately lead to a 
balance of  payments crisis. Under these circumstances, capital flight 
became extreme. 
Brazil 
The Brazilian case is special in that the policy mistakes  may well 
have been minor. Brazil certainly ran very large budget deficits. Oil 
price increases and increased world interest rates were absorbed by 
the public sector deficit, and the resulting external deficit was financed 
by increased borrowing abroad. But much of the earlier borrowing by 
state enterprises, especially in  1972-78,  financed a massive national 
investment effort (Cardoso 1986). 
In Brazil’s case, tight restrictions on imports and the near absence 
of  capital flight made for an experience very different from that  of 
Argentina, Mexico, or Chile. The chief source of  debt accumulation 
was the public sector, which meant that the damage was much more 
limited than was the case in the other countries. Indeed, by early 1985 
it seemed that lower interest rates and a sharply reduced oil price helped 
solve Brazil’s debt problems for the major part. Since then the current 
account has once again deteriorated, in part as a result of  an overly 
expansionary policy. But even so, Brazil is among the debtor countries 
that are more likely to be able to sustain growth and debt service. 
3.2.2  The World Macroeconomy 
A major part in the origins of the debt crisis was played by the sharp 
downturn in the world economy during 1979-81.  In the 1970s, partly 
as a result of  the oil shocks, but also because of  overexpansionary 
policies,  the United  States had  experienced increasing  inflation.  In 
1979-81,  under  the pressure  of  the  collapsing dollar,  U.S. policies 170  Rudiger Dornbusch/Thomas S. Johnson/Anne 0.  Krueger 
changed sharply. The full-employment budget was cut by  nearly  1.5 
percentage points of GNP. Nominal interest rates were allowed to rise 
from 9 percent in  1978 to 17  percent in  1981, and real interest rates 
increased sharply. 
The sharp change in the world economic environment is shown in 
table 3.7, which compares the early 1970s and the period preceding the 
debt crisis. The early 1970s favored debtors: strong growth, high infla- 
tion, and low interest rates. By comparison, in  1980-82  inflation was 
low, interest rates were extraordinarily high, and growth was stagnant. 
It is particularly important in this context to see the real interest 
rate issue. For debtor LDCs the U.S. real interest rate is hardly ap- 
propriate. An alternative is provided by the inflation rate in world trade. 
Manufactures prices were declining by  2.4 percent while commodity 
prices fell by  13.3 percent per year. Any realistic estimate of real in- 
terest rates cannot fail to come up with extraordinarily high rates. 
Commodity price developments have different effects depending on 
whether  a particular  debtor is  a  net  exporter or a net  importer of 
commodities.  The point  is important in  a comparison of  Korea and 
Latin America.  Korea (like Japan, for example) is a net importer of 
commodities. As a result, the collapse of  commodity prices in  1979- 
81 helped offset in part the oil price increase. Brazil, by contrast, is a 
net exporter of commodities and has a production structure that makes 
the country vulnerable to oil price increases and commodity price de- 
creases. Table 3.8 shows terms of trade changes and highlights the very 
different experience of various debtor groups. 
Table 3.7  Key Macroeconomic Variables of the World Economy (annual 
percentage rates) 
Inflationa 
LIBOR  Manufactures  Commodities  OECD Growth 
1970-73  7.6  12.4  14.4  5.9 
1980-82  14.7  -  2.4  -  13.3  0.9 
Sources: IMF IFS and World Bank Commodity Trade and Price  Trends. 
“Inflation rate in world trade 
Table 3.8  Terms of Trade Changes, 1978-82  (cumulative percentage change) 
Small  Non-Oil 
Fuel  15  Heavy  Low-Income  LDC  Net Oil 
Exporters  Debtors  Countries  Exporters  Importers 
54.5  7.9  -27.8  18.2  -20.1 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook. 171  Our LDC Debts 
These world economic developments meant that most LDCs expe- 
rienced a sharp deterioration in their current account. Reduced export 
revenues, on account of the decline in commodity prices  and world 
recession, were reinforced by sharply increased nominal debt service 
burdens. Thus debtors were made illiquid. To continue on the accus- 
tomed course, external financing needed to increase sharply. The lack 
of smooth financing in the case of Mexico then brought on generalized 
credit rationing. 
3.2.3  Overlending and Credit Rationing 
In the period to mid-1982, reckless lending was the rule. It is possible 
today to search the 1980-81 discussion of debt problems for warnings 
of the crisis to come. The Bank for International Settlements had ex- 
pressed concern at least since 1978. A Group of Thirty inquiry in 1981 
sought to uncover whether banks felt debt was a major issue and failed 
to find dominant concern (Group of Thirty 1981a, 1981b; Kraft 1984). 
In a survey of one hundred banks the question was posed, “Last time 
no serious debt defaults arose. This time do you think that a general 
debt problem affecting countries is likely to emerge?” In response, 72 
percent of the banks questioned expressed the view that a debt crisis 
was not likely, 13 percent thought it might possibly happen, and only 
15 percent replied in the affirmative (Group of Thirty, 1981b). 
If there were some concerns, they were certainly not enough to stop 
a final lending boom. Table 3.9 shows Latin America’s current account 
deficit and its financing. Between  1979 and  1981, private lending to 
Latin America exactly doubled. It is unclear how these credits were 
justified at the time. There were two arguments. One was the need for 
Table 3.9  Latin America: Current Account Imbalances and Financing 
(billions of U.S. dollars) 
Borrowing 


































Source: IMF World Economic Outlook. 
=Including reserve-related  liabilities.  Private capital flows (flight) and errors and ornis- 
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recycling, which had worked well at the time of the first oil shock. The 
other was  the lack of  information  on country  exposure.  Neither  of 
course is a reasonable explanation. 
Subsequent to overlending was credit rationing following the Mex- 
ican moratorium of August 1982. As shown in table 3.9, private lending 
fell off dramatically and in  1985 even turned negative. The credit ra- 
tioning phenomenon is not surprising; faced with a country’s inability 
to meet debt service, each individual lender is reluctant to put up money 
that would  only serve to pay other banks’ claims.  Hence without  a 
cartel there is no lending. But if  there is no lending then, of  course, 
debt service is impossible and hence debtors will default. 
The problem in 1982 was therefore to develop a system that would 
organize creditors. They would have to provide the part of debt service 
that could not be extracted by improvements in debtor-country external 
balances. At the same time the cartel would serve, much as the oc- 
cupation of customs houses in the old days, to extract a maximum of 
debt service by a lien on the debtor countries’ macroeconomic policies. 
The IMF,  having been  ignored in  the  1970s, eagerly (and skillfully) 
assumed the task of orchestrating debt collection, fiscal discipline, and 
forced lending. 
3.3  The Transfer Problem and Debt Service Fatigue 
We  now ask why debt service appears to be such a major problem. 
In one sense the answer is quite straightforward: countries that used 
to spend, borrowing the resources from official and private creditors 
(with little thought  of  how to service or even less repay the loans), 
now no longer command these resources-they  are limited to spending 
(this section draws on Dornbusch 1985b, 1986b, and  1986~).  The ad- 
justment in complicated by two facts. The first is the macroeconomics 
of earning foreign exchange; the second is the political economy prob- 
lem of finding extra budget resources for debt service. These issues 
are familiar from the discussion of  German reparation payments fol- 
lowing World War  I.8 Exactly the same issues arise in the context of 
the involuntary debt service now underway. 
3.3.1  The Reduction in Spending 
The first issue is how a country adjusts to a reduction in its spendable 
resources. Before the debt crisis, foreign loans supplemented domestic 
income, enlarging the resources that could be spent. Interest payments 
on loans were automatically provided in the form of new money, and 
the principal on debts was automatically rolled over. With managing 
the debt so easy, and with ready access to resources beyond what was 
required to service the debt, spending ran high. After credit rationing 173  Our LDC Debts 
began in 1982, spending had to be limited, and absorption fell below 
the level of  output as interest now had to be paid out of current pro- 
duction. Interest payments now had to be earned by noninterest sur- 
pluses in the current account. 
Table 3.10 shows the debt service process at work. In the post-1982 
period of involuntary lending, debtor countries achieved a shift in their 
noninterest external balance of nearly 5 percent of GDP. This external 
balance improvement served to make net transfers of interest to the 
creditors. It was matched by a nearly equal reduction in investment in 
the debtor countries. 
This perverse resource transfer, of course, came at the expense of 
living standards in the developing countries. But more important, the 
transfer had as a counterpart a sharp decline in investment. Interest 
payments thus were really financed by a mortgage on future standards 
of  living and  on the debtors’ growth potential.  In countries  where 
population growth is high and income distribution is appalling, such a 
policy may turn out to be very shortsighted. 
But there remained the issue of how to distribute the cut in spending 
between  its various components: government, consumption, and in- 
vestment. As we saw above, a large part of the cut took the form of 
reduced  investment.  There  was,  of  course, also  a  decline  in  con- 
sumption. A fall in  investment was  not enough  due to two  special 
features of  the adjustment process.  First, cutting total demand has 
macroeconomic multiplier  effects  that  translate  into  a reduction  in 
output, income, and hence private spending. Second, at the same time 
that involuntary debt service started, there also occured a deteriora- 
tion in the world economy that required an extra downward adjustment 
in spending. 
3.3.2  The Foreign Exchange Problem 
The second macroeconomic issue in adjusting to debt concerns the 
fact that the country needs to earn dollars, not pesos. In other words 
it needs to generate a trade surplus. The cut in spending will, of course, 
reduce import demand and also free exportables for sale abroad, but 
for two reasons that will not be enough. First, a sizable fraction of the 
lsble 3.10  Latin America: Investment and the External Noninterest Surplus 
(percentage of  GDP) 
1977-82  1983-85  Change 
Gross investment  24.3  18.5  -5.8 
Noninterest external surplus  -0.6  4.7  5.3 
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expenditure cut will fall on domestic (nontraded) goods, not tradables. 
The spending cut thus creates directly unemployment rather than po- 
tential foreign exchange earnings. Even for those goods that are directly 
tradable it is not necessarily the case that increased supplies can be 
sold. Often there is the problem of obtaining market access, and, if the 
goods are not homogeneous commodities like cotton or copper, a cut 
in their price is required to realize increased sales. Even then, unless 
demand is sufficiently responsive, total earnings may not increase. 
To translate the spending cut into foreign exchange earnings, a gain 
in competitiveness is required. The gain in competitiveness draws re- 
sources into the tradable goods sector and in the world market makes 
it possible to sell the increased production of tradable goods. Of course, 
the only way to gain competitiveness is by reducing the wage in dollars 
by a real depreciation. But the real wage cut also generates increased 
unemployment, at least in the short run, as the spendable income of 
workers is cut. The size of the required cut in real wages is larger, the 
larger the share of trade goods in income and the smaller the share of 
wages in GDP. 
The overwhelming difficulty in the adjustment process is that external 
adjustment via a gain in  competitiveness reduces employment. The 
dominant effect on employment is from the reduction in real wages 
and the resulting reduction in domestic demand. The positive employ- 
ment response that would be expected in  the tradable goods  sector 
from the gain in  competitiveness is often very  weak and slow. One 
reason is that expectations of  a sustained change in competitiveness 
do not take hold immediately. The traded goods sector thus adopts a 
wait-and-see attitude, which makes real depreciation a highly precar- 
ious policy tool. The Mexican experience in this respect is particularly 
instructive. 
A second important difficulty arises from the worldwide adjustment 
to forced debt service. Since most debtor countries were overspending 
in the early  1980s and are now under a forced debt service regime, 
they all had to resort to real depreciation to enhance their competi- 
tiveness.  But that means they are competitively  cutting their wages 
relative to each other, and not only relative to those of  the creditor 
countries. As a result, an isolated country, cutting its dollar wage, say, 
by 50 percent, will gain much less in terms of increased dollar revenues 
because all the competing LDCs are doing much the same. 
3.3.3  The Budget Problem 
The third  macroeconomic  problem  in  the  adjustment process in- 
volves  the  budget. Much  of  the external debt  is public  or publicly 
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up in the public sector in the aftermath of the crises, as a result of bank 
failures.  The government thus must service a debt that  before was 
either in private hands or automatically serviced by new money. The 
problem, of course, is where to find the extra 3 percent or 4 percent 
of budget revenue that will pay these new interest costs. 
There are basically four avenues: raising taxes and public  sector 
prices, reducing government outlays, printing money, or issuing do- 
mestic  debt. Raising taxes is notoriously  difficult since most of  the 
taxes are already levied in the form of social security taxes on workers. 
An easier solution is to raise public sector prices or to eliminate sub- 
sidies. The elimination of subsidies is particularly cheered by creditors 
and international agencies  since it means moving closer to efficient 
resource allo~ation.~  Of  course, the imposition of extra taxes or the 
withdrawal of  subsidies is inevitably inflationary from the price side 
unless the tax increase or subsidy cut is offset by a reduction in other 
prices or wages. Of  course, via the revenue side reduces the growth 
in money and hence, in combination, it leads to a recession with infla- 
tionary pressure sustained by prevailing inflation. 
Cutting government spending is another option. Attention here fo- 
cuses on the often extreme inefficiency of the public sector. The public 
perceives that there must be a way to pay the bills out of increased 
efficiency,  rather than reduced private absorption. The fact is, of course, 
that there is little room for public sector improvements in the short 
term. Large-scale firing of redundant workers would create an over- 
whelming political problem. Plant closings are of the same kind, and 
selling inefficient, overunionized firms runs into the obvious problem 
that the potential buyers might need to be paid to take over the liability. 
Perhaps the best advice may be that public sector firms should be simply 
given away. The problem is that the workers might oppose even that. 
The most common adjustment is a cut in or freeze of public sector 
wages. This has happened in most of the debtor countries, and in some 
cases on a very large scale. It does help the budget, but it presents its 
own problems. The reduction in relative wages for the public sector 
promotes an exodus of the wrong kind. The efficient workers leave and 
only those with little alternative stay in the public sector. 
In many of the debtor countries the answer to forced debt service 
has almost inevitably been to increase government budget deficits and 
to finance this by issuing debt or printing money. Money finance brings 
with it the problem of high and often extreme inflation. It is no accident 
that Argentina and Brazil experienced extraordinary inflation rates in 
the aftermath of the debt crisis. When deficits are financed by debt, 
while the imminent inflation problem may be absent, there is still the 
issue of excessive debt accumulation which ultimately poses the risk 
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There is an interaction between the foreign exchange problem and 
the budget problem. The need to devalue to gain competitiveness im- 
plies that the value of debt service in home currency increases. A given 
payment of, say, $1  billion now amounts to more in pesos, produces 
a larger peso deficit, and hence gives rise to the need for increased 
inflationary finance. Thus devaluation is a source of inflation not just 
directly via the increased prices of traded goods and any accompanying 
indexation effects. It works also indirectly by raising the required in- 
flation tax.  In the classical hyperinflations, major movements in the 
exchange rate were the prelude to the outbreak of  uncontrolled infla- 
tion; there is some evidence that exactly the same process is at work 
in the debtor countries today (see Dornbusch and Fischer 1986; Fischer 
1986a, 1986b). 
The budget is also adversely affected by the problem of capital flight. 
To  stem capital flight, provoked by the inflationary consequences of 
debt service or perhaps by an impending tax reform, the country will 
have to raise real interest rates to very high levels.  These high real 
interest rates in turn apply to the domestic debt, causing it to grow 
more rapidly, and thereby raising future budget deficits and hence the 
prospect of instability. That in  turn feeds more capital flight and yet 
higher rates. There is thus an extraordinary vicious circle surrounding 
the sudden need  to service debt and the inability to do so through 
ordinary taxation. 
cess. To earn foreign exchange, the real wage must be cut in terms of 
tradable goods, thus enhancing competitiveness.  But to balance the 
budget it is often necessary or at least recommended to cut subsidies 
for such items as food or transportation, and that also means a cut in 
real wages. There is thus competition between two targets-a  cut in 
the dollar wage or a cut in the tortilla wage. A choice must be made 
because there is only so much one can cut. Because of the lags with 
which the trade sector adjusts, the competitiveness adjustment should 
take  precedence  and  that  budget  balancing  should follow once the 
economy’s resources are reallocated. Since the real depreciation by 
itself is already bound to produce slack, there is no risk of overheating 
in this sequence of adjustment. 
A final point is the link between budget cutting and the extraordinary 
fall in  Latin  American  investment.  In  the  category  of  government 
spending, the easiest cuts are in investment. Postponing investment 
and maintenance is  much  easier  than  firing workers.  The resulting 
impact on aggregate investment is so large because the public sector, 
in the form of  public sector enterprises, accounts for a large part of 
total investment and because the public sector was in the forefront of 
adjustment. This is a very ineffective means of adjustment because it 
fails to recognize the distinction between the public sector’s current 
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3.4.4  Case Study: Mexico 
Mexico illustrates in a striking way many of these issues. The least 
noted fact, apparent in table 3.11, is the dramatic shift in the budget 
over the past three years. The noninterest or primary budget has im- 
proved  by  more than 7 percent  of  GDP.  From a deficit of  nearly  4 
percent  of  GDP in  1982, the noninterest  balance has  shifted to an 
estimated surplus of  3.2 percent in 1986. The improvement is all the 
more impressive in view of the large decline in oil revenue in  1986. 
Note that the whole improvement in the noninterest budget went to 
finance increased interest payments on the domestic and foreign debt. 
The total budget records a deficit of nearly  16 percent of  GDP for 
1986. The increase in interest payments is largely a reflection of  infla- 
tion, Inflation and the accompanying exchange rate depreciation raise 
the nominal interest rates required to make Mexicans hold the depre- 
ciating asset. These interest rates in turn translate into a large interest 
bill in the budget. There is a budget deficit because there is inflation, 
not the other way around. 
Table 3.12 shows further details on the Mexican  macroeconomic 
situation. We  already saw the cut in public sector investment. The table 
indicates that total investment shows a sharp decline, leaving little net 
investment. 
Table 3.11  Mexico's Budget (percentage of GDP) 
1982  1983  1984  1985  1986= 
~~ 
Budget deficit  17.1  8.9  7.7  8.4  15.8 
Primary deficit  3.7  -5.2  -  5.4  -4.2  -3.2 
Public investment  9.3  6.6  6.5  6.1  5.1 
Operational deficit  n.a.  -  0.2  -  0.7  -  0.9  -2.1 
Source:  Mexico, Presidencia de la Republica and Secretaria de Heacienda  y  Credito 
Publico. 
aEstimate. 
Table 3.12  Mexico: Macroeconomic Indicators 
~~ 
1970-81  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986a 
Per capita growth  3.5  -2.8  -7.5  1.4  0.4  -6.3 
Inflation  17  99  81  59  60  100 
InvestmentEDP  23.6  21.1  16.0  16.3  16.9  14.9 
Real wage (1981 = 100)  n.a.  1  05  76  73  67  64 
Current account/GDP  -3.5  -3.8  3.8  2.5  0.3  -2.6 
External interest/GDP  n.a.  7.5  7.1  7.0  6.0  6.4 
Price of  oil ($US/barrel)  12.4  28.6  26.4  26.8  25.4  11.2 
Source: IMF and Secretaria de Hacienda y Credito Publico. 
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Consider next the current account. There is a striking turnaround, 
from the deficits prior to the crisis to surpluses afterward. In 1983-84 
the surpluses were enough to help finance capital flight and also meet 
the interest payments. In 1985, interest was paid out of these surpluses 
by attracting a reflow of  private capital via very high interest rates. 
But with the oil price decline the external financing problem returned, 
forcing a choice between further real depreciation and an alteration in 
the terms of debt service. 
The real exchange rate and the real wage both declined sharply in 
the past few years. Real wages today are 40 percent below their 1980 
levels, and the external competitiveness has improved by 40 percent. 
These are extraordinary adjustments for any country to make. Finally 
there is the employment story. The labor force is growing at 3.5 percent 
per  year,  but  employment after an initial decline  has  been  entirely 
stagnant over the past four years. The informal sector and migration 
to the United States were the main shock absorbers in employment. 
Thus unemployment is growing and so too is social conflict. The lack 
of employment growth, even after so extreme a real depreciation, is 
an issue of major concern. It suggests that depreciation reduces em- 
ployment for quite a while before the substitution takes over. 
Early  results for trade were disappointing.  More recently Mexico 
has started to build up a strong non-oil export growth, but that has 
turned out to be a mixed blessing. U.S. trade concerns have spilled 
over to Mexico in the form of more than one hundred countervailing 
duty cases! 
3.3.5  Case Study: Brazil 
Brazil, just like Mexico, started off her adjustment with a large de- 
cline in per capita income and with a sharp acceleration of inflation. 
The inflation acceleration is largely due to the real depreciation required 
to generate a noninterest surplus. The presence of indexation translated 
exchange depreciation into an increase in inflation. The higher inflation 
in turn showed up in a sharply larger budget deficit (see table 3.13). 
The noninterest external balance improved sharply. This is seen in 
table 3.13 in the shift of the noninterest current account from a deficit 
of  2 percent of GDP in 1982 to a 3.5-5  percent surplus in 1984-86. In 
contrast to Mexico, the Brazilian budget  has not improved sharply, 
which has meant more stimulus to growth and to recovery. 
The difference between the case studies of Mexico and Brazil, in 
1986, is in both oil and macroeconomics. Lower oil prices in Brazil’s 
case more than compensate for the adverse conditions of the boom on 
the external balance.  But the external balance is certainly also im- 
proved by the import substitution and export capacity expansion made 
possible by the investments of the early 1970s, which came on line just 
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Table 3.13  Brazil: Macroeconomic Indicators 
1982  1983  1984  1985  1986= 
Inflation  99  142  197  227  65 
Per capita growth  -  1.3  -5.5  2.3  6.1  6.8 
Budget deficitb 
Actual deficit  16.7  19.9  22.2  27.1  10.9 
Operational deficit  6.5  3.0  1.6  3.5  5.1 
Current account deficitb  8.5  3.5  -  0.1  -0.1 
External interest  6.5  5.3  5.4  4.7  3.7 
Noninterest deficit  2.0  -  1.8  -  5.4  -4.6  -3.6 
Source: Banco Central do Brasil. 
=Estimate. 
bPercentage of  GDP. 
3.4  Bank Exposure and the Quality of  Debts 
In this section we review the debt problem from the side of  com- 
mercial bank creditors by looking at the extent of exposure and at the 
quality of debts. 
3.4.1  Exposure 
Table 3.14 gives a broad overview of loans by U.S. banks to regions 
other than the industrial countries or offshore banking centers. In these 
categories, Nigeria and Venezuela are included among the OPEC coun- 
tries while Mexico is part of the non-OPEC countries. 
Between 1977 and 1982, claims on non-OPEC countries more than 
doubled. By contrast, since then there has been a complete standstill 
in lending. The table shows that loans to Eastern Europe are small and 
relatively stable in size. Exposure to OPEC countries is more sizable 
and has declined since 1982. 
Table 3.15 looks at lending to non-OPEC developing countries, this 
time disaggregating by  size of bank.  We  also show how these claims 
have evolved relative to equity capital. 
Three conclusions emerge from table 3.15. First, debt is a “big bank” 
problem. More than 60  percent of total debt is owed to the major money 
center banks, and nearly 85 percent to only twenty-five major banks. 
lsble 3.14 
Year  OPEC  Non-OPEC  Eastern Europe 
U.S. Bank Claims on Nonindustrial Countries (billions of dollars) 
1977  14.3 
1982  23.2 







~  ~~ 
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Table 3.15  U.S. Bank Claims on Non-OPEC LDCs 
All Banks  9 Major  15 Major  All Other 
Total claims (billion $) 
1978  52.5  33.4  9.9  8.9 
1982  101.9  61.5  20.6  19.8 
1985  100.9  63.5  19.8  16.9 
Percentage of  capital 
1978  110 
1982  154 
1985  99 
163  107  57 
227  162  75 
156  99  41 
Source:  Federal Reserve. 
Second, small banks have managed to reduce their claims over the past 
three years by 15 percent. Third, all banks and in particular the money 
center banks have been able to reduce their exposure measured as a 
percentage of  capital. The exposure reduction has occurred primarily 
via a buildup of  capital, in part by issuing equity commitment notes. 
But in  part the exposure reduction is due to sell-off of  loans, write- 
downs, and a slowdown or actual halt in new money commitments. 
To judge  the implications of  LDC problem  debts for the banking 
system, we look at table 3.16 at the group of  most heavily indebted 
countries. For simplicity we take all of Latin America (including Ven- 
ezuela) plus Nigeria, the Philippines, Morocco, and Yugoslavia. The 
total exposure in  1985 was close to $100 billion and approximately 90 
percent of bank  capital. Thus, in  the extreme situation of  all these 
debtors repudiating their debts completely, bank  stockholders would 
be largely, though not altogether, wiped out, while depositors would 
be left fully intact. That picture is more favorable than much of the 
public discussion of the “LDC debt bomb” might lead one to believe. 
Of  course, this point holds only in the aggregate and thus is not very 
Table 3.16  U.S. Bank Exposure to Problem Debtors, 1985 
All Banks  9 Major  I5 Major  All Other 
Total exposure (billion $) 
Latin America  80.4  60.5  16.0  15.2 
Other debtors  12.6  8.8  1.9  1.2 
Percentage of  capital 
Latin America  78.9  148.6  80.0  36.9 
Other debtors  12.3  21.7  9.5  2.9 
Source:  Federal Reserve. 181  Our LDC Debts 
revealing. The more revealing comparison disaggregates by bank size. 
In this case it becomes apparent that their exposure is far in excess of 
their equity. Brazil, Argentina and the Philippines alone (to take the 
1987 major confrontation cases) account already for more than half of 
the capital of major banks. 
Even Latin America's  debt is to a large extent held by  non-U.S. 
banks. The Bank for International Settlements reports Latin American 
debt to banks in the reporting countries of  $160 billion in 1985. Table 
3.17 shows that only about one half of that debt is owed to U.S. banks. 
For the remaining problem debtors, the BIS total is $37 billion. In their 
case the U.S. loans are thus only one-third of the total of exposure to 
banks in the United States and elsewhere (Bank for International Set- 
tlements 1986). 
There is an important difference, though, between European and 
U.S. banks. During the period of dollar appreciation, European banks 
were forced to increase their reserves against dollar loans. Furthermore 
these loan provisions were facilitated by tax advantages. Since 1985 
the dollar has depreciated significantly, and this has worked to further 
increase European  loan loss reserves relative  to their claims. As a 
result, European banks are said to have been able, in some instances, 
to set aside loan loss reserves to fully cover problem debts. This, of 
course, is far from the case for U.S.  banks. 
Table 3.17  Market Price of  Problem Debt, December 1986 (billions 
of  dollars) 
Country 
Debt to 
Total Debt  U.S.  Banks  Price" 
Argentina  50.8  8.4  66.0 
Bolivia  4.0  0.1  7.5 
Brazil  107.3  22.2  75.5 
Chile  21.0  6.5  68.0 
Colombia  11.3  2.2  86.5 
Ecuador  8.5  n.a.  65.5 
Ivory Coast  8.0  0.4  77.0 
Mexico  99.0  24.2  56.5 
Morocco  14.0  0.8  69.5 
Nigeria  19.3  0.9  39.0 
Peru  13.4  1.5  19.0 
Philippines  24.8  5.1  73.5 
Uruguay  3.6  0.9  66.5 
Venezuela  33.6  9.7  74.5 
Yugoslavia  19.6  2.2  79.0 
Weighted average  67.1 
Source: Dealer information. 
=Average of  bid and offer price in cents per dollar debt. 182  Rudiger Dornbusch/Thomas S. JohnsodAnne 0.  Krueger 
3.4.2  The Quality of Debts 
In the nineteenth century and until World War 11, LDC debt mostly 
took the form of  bonds traded on organized markets and widely held 
by the public. The postwar debt, by contrast, is owed to official insti- 
tutions and commercial banks. Accordingly, there are no good price 
quotations that might be used  as a measure of  the quality of  debts. 
Very little of claims on debtor LDCs takes the form of  bonds.l0 But 
for some time, bank claims on various LDCs have been swapped be- 
tween banks,  sold outright between banks, and are now even being 
sold to nonbanks. The market has become central to discussions of 
debt-equity swaps. In these transactions, further discussed below, pur- 
chase of discounted debt is the starting point for a foreign investment 
in a debtor country. 
Table 3.17 shows the average of  the bid and offer price in  the sec- 
ondhand market. It would be a mistake to believe that all debts are 
actively  traded,  but  even  so the prices provide  some  indication  of 
market valuation. 
There are quite extraordinary divergences in prices. Bolivia, Peru, 
and Nigeria have low valuations, but perhaps more interesting is the 
difference between Mexico and Brazil. Why is Brazil thought to be so 
much better a credit risk than Mexico? The major difference would 
have to be  between being an exporter and  an importer of  oil.  The 
average price of problem debts is 67 cents per dollar. Discounts of  25 
percent and more suggest that these are indeed problem debts and that 
the prospect of a return to voluntary lending might be very remote. 
However, the story is not that simple. Consider the case of Uruquay. 
The country’s debt stands at a discount of 23.5 percent, suggesting that 
the debt is poor. Yet  in the fall of  1986, Uruquay issued a long-term 
public sector bond at the same rate as the U.S. Treasury. This suggests 
that the large discounts reflect above all a market that is too narrow, 
so it is illiquidity of banks that dominates in depressing the prices. 
3.5  U.S. Trade Effects of the Debt Crisis 
There is considerable difficulty in allocating the deterioration of  the 
U.S. external balance between competing causes: the overly strong 
dollar, the rapid domestic growth relative to that abroad, the budget 
deficit, and the turn around forced on debtors’ trade balances by the 
need to service external debts. 
Table 3.18 gives some indication of  the shift in our trade with Latin 
America. Not all of  the shift can be attributed to the debt crisis since 
our loss in competitiveness must certainly account for some part of 
what happened. Also, the trade figures of  the early  1980s are inflated 
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'hble 3.18  U.S. Trade with South America (billions of U.S. dollars) 
Exports  Imports  Trade Balance 
1979  13.6 
1980  17.4 
1981  17.7 
1982  15.3 
1983  10.5 
1984  11.0 













-  10.0 
-  9.9 
Source: Survey of  Current Business. 
there was a major shift in the bilateral balance amounting to $10-12 
billion from 1979 to 1985." 
Table 3.19 compares the evolution  of  Latin American  trade  with 
different countries, showing a substantial shift toward bilateral  sur- 
pluses with respect to each of these groups. While the surplus with the 
United States is far larger in absolute terms, this is not the case when 
the change is expressed relative to exports. This is a crude way of 
illustrating that the dollar appreciation may not be so dominant in this 
bilateral trade balance swing. 
If $10 billion is taken as the change in the bilateral trade balance, 
even attributing it to the debt crisis, one does not come up with much 
damage to the United  States. After all, this change is less than one- 
quarter of one percent of U.S. GNP! Of course, this does not exhaust 
the damage, and GNP is not the proper scale variable. Other damage 
to U.S.  trade and investment interests occurs via the depression of 
demand and profitability in the debtor countries. U.S. multinationals 
that produce in those countries have sharply reduced sales and profits. 
Similarly, there are declines in  U.S. exports of  services (other than 
interest) to debtors. There are no ready estimates of losses in service 
exports. 
In judging whether a $10 billion deterioration in the trade balance is 
large, one must bear in mind two points. The swing in the trade deficit 
helps  facilitate  a  noninflationary  absorption  of  our  budget  deficit. 
'hble 3.19  Latin America's Bilateral Trade Balance with Various Groups 
(billions of dollars) 
U.S.  Japan  EEC  Industrial Countries 
1980 
1985 
-3.4  - 
10.8 
-2.4  2.8  -4.2 
0  7.7  18.7 
Change as 
% of  exports  42.9  54.8  20.8  35.1 
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Switching lending from LDCs to the U.S. Treasury helps finance our 
own deficits under better (short-term) macroeconomic conditions. But 
there is clearly a cost for the affected industries. A large share of the 
trade deterioration, for example, is in the capital goods sector as Latin 
America’s decline in investment reduced our exports. For this sector 
the trade deterioration with Latin America is, of course, far above the 
one-quarter of one percent of income. Even so, it would be difficult 
to make  the debt crisis  the main  reason  for our $150 billion  trade 
problem. 
3.6  Solutions to the Debt Problem 
The ordinary aftermath of  imprudent borrowing and adverse inter- 
national conditions, as in  the  1920s and  1930s most recently, is debt 
default.**  Debts are normally written down or simply not serviced for 
many years. When servicing is ultimately resumed, it occurs without 
full payment of  arrears and often at reduced interest rates. 
The major differences in the present debt crisis are two. First, com- 
mercial banks and governments, rather than bondholders, are the main 
creditors. A more significant difference is that the governments of the 
major industrialized countries have insisted on debt service and have 
managed a system of debt collection, with the IMF as the chief co- 
ordinating agent. The system avoids illiquidity by  making available 
essential “new money” at profitable spreads over the cost of funds to 
banks, and it enforces the debts by behind-the-scenes political pressure. 
The creditors are efficiently organized in this case-by-case approach, 
while debtors have been unable to put up a united front.13 
The debtors’ problem, especially in the case of  Latin America, is 
how to gain debt relief or additional credit, so as to make available 
resources  for investment and develop speculation  in  support of  the 
government’s ability to promote growth policies without risking finan- 
cial instability. Tax reform and improved tax enforcement are certainly 
of  overriding  importance  in  this.  Improved efficiency in  the  public 
sector is important, but measures to attract capital or secure relief on 
the external debt seem the most desirable or practicable alternatives. 
We  review here five possible directions of change: an improved world 
macroeconomy, a facility, debt-equity swaps, a reversal of capital flight, 
and Bradley-style debt relief. 
3.6.1  The World Macroeconomy 
In 1982 the prospects of strong growth in the industrialized countries, 
lower  interest rates,  a weaker  dollar, and  stronger real  commodity 
prices were the central scenario that encouraged the “muddling-through 185  Our LDC Debts 
process.’’ This favorable scenario implied that by the end of the decade, 
debt-export  ratios would have declined  significantly. Some of  these 
developments have in fact occurred, and for some countries they have 
even been reinforced by an unexpectedly large decline in oil prices. 
But the expected benefits in terms of enhanced creditworthiness have 
not in general appeared.  It is true that South Korea is at present not 
a problem debtor, but Brazil is and so are many other countries. 
Looking ahead to the next few years, what macroeconomic devel- 
opments can be expected and how will they affect the debt situation? 
The most important development for the world economy is U.S.  budget 
balancing. There are basically three scenarios. In one case, rapid budget 
cutting is accommodated by monetary expansion in the United States 
and in the rest of the world. In this setting, interest rates decline sharply, 
growth is sustained, and the main exchange rates between industrial 
countries remain unaltered. This is a highly favorable scenario for LDCs 
in that much lower interest rates implicitly transfer to them resources 
in amounts far in excess of what can be expected from creditor-country 
taxpayers. 
The second  scenario envisages the same budget  cutting, perhaps 
more spread out in time, but without monetary accommodation. In that 
case, interest rates decline somewhat, but there will be a world reces- 
sion. Most debtors would not benefit, or at least very little, since the 
lower interest rates are offset by slack in their export markets. 
A third scenario envisages a hard landing: budget cutting and a flight 
from the dollar that forces the Federal Reserve to raise interest rates 
to stem the inflationary impact of depreciation. Such a development 
would bring about systemwide illiquidity and likely default. 
The world macroeconomy does hold out some promise. A Gramm- 
Rudman-Hollings budget cut, soon and with worldwide monetary ac- 
commodation, would make a major advance toward solving the debt 
problem. But for the time being there is not much of a sign of either 
the budget cutting or the monetary accommodation. 
3.6.2  Debt-Equity Swaps 
The debt problem has two aspects. The first is that debtors cannot 
service their debts as contracted. Moreover, the interest they pay comes 
largely at the expense of much needed investment in their economies. 
Thus debtors have a resource and investment shortage. On the lenders 
side, small banks are tired of the acrobatics involved in debt collection. 
They want to avoid yet another round of rescheduling. But there is no 
money in the debtor countries to pay them off, nor can the large banks 
do so, given their already extravagant exposure. These twin problems 
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The poor quality of  LDC loans can be judged by the discount at 
which they trade in the emerging secondhand market. The large dis- 
counts suggest that an imminent return to voluntary lending is highly 
unlikely. Creditors’ attention is therefore shifting to new ways of liq- 
uidating debts without taking outright and massive losses on the entire 
portfolio. But if  banks are to get out, who will get in? 
Debt-equity swaps have emerged as a seemingly attractive solution 
to the debt problem-clearly not the solution, but a sound contribution 
with all the rings of free enterprise.14 Their apparent merit is in solving 
two problems  at once: they allow banks to sell off  loans  without  a 
massive decline in loan prices, and debtors can reduce their external 
debt and at the same time pull in foreign investment. All things con- 
sidered, the swaps appear to be a good idea. But there are reasons for 
skepticism. 
Before turning to these objections, a qualification is important. There 
should be no doubt that debt-equity swaps agreed to between private 
firms and their commercial bank creditors (without government inter- 
vention or subsidies) are entirely appropriate. Likewise, there can be 
no objection to direct foreign investment. On the contrary, there should 
have been more in the past, and the more there is in the future the 
better. The objections raised here concern exclusively the use of  al- 
ready strained debtor budgets to grease the wheels. 
The basic difficulty is that debt-equity swaps amount to a budget 
subsidy by debtor countries that will allow banks to get out and foreign 
investors to get in. Here are the mechanics: First Regional Bank sells 
Brazilian government bonds at a discount to Dreams, Inc., a U.S.  firm 
specializing in services. Dreams, Inc., presents the debt to the Banco 
Central do Brasil to be paid off in cruzados. The proceeds are used for 
the purchase of a Brazilian firm. It seems that everybody gains: the 
bank  has found  a way of  selling some its illiquid portfolio  without 
depressing the secondhand market; the investing firm gains the advan- 
tage of  buying cruzados at a discount; and Brazil gains because she 
can pay the foreign debt in local currency rather than in dollars. More- 
over, much needed investment takes place. 
The debtor government will have to finance the repurchase of  debt 
from the foreign investor. One cannot simply print local money to pay. 
In fact the government will issue domestic debt and use the proceeds 
to buy back its foreign debt as it is presented by the foreign investor. 
Hence, when everything is done, the government has a reduced ex- 
ternal debt, but a matching increase in  domestic debt. The country 
owns less of its capital stock, since the foreign investor will have bought 
some, and in return has redeemed some of  its external debt. 
Is there any advantage for the budget? In the budget there will now 
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domestic debt service. There is a net reduction in interest if the debtor 
country can appropriate most of the discount at which the external 
debt is traded and if the real domestic interest rate (in dollars) is not 
too high relative to the cost of  servicing the external debt. The net 
result is likely to be an increase in debt service because real interest 
rates in debtor countries are exceptionally high. 
On the balance of payments side, however, swaps might seem to be 
good news: foreign debt is reduced and as a result burdensome interest 
payments to abroad  come down.  But  the reduced  external interest 
payments are matched, at least potentially, by increased remittances 
of dividends or profits by the new foreign owners of the national capital 
stock. Hence, on the payments side the trick also does not do much 
good. In fact, the country becomes less liquid since it is much easier 
to control the service of bank debt than the remittances of  multina- 
tionals. The massive outflow of remittances from Brazil in 1986 makes 
this point. 
Debt-equity swaps are primarily a balance sheet operation, not a net 
resource transfer. One might argue that the government could target 
deals to make them less a transaction in existing assets and instead be 
directed toward new, extra investment.  More likely, financial inter- 
mediaries  will  look for firms, domestic or foreign, that are already 
investing. They will approach the firms with a new kind of financing 
package involving debt-equity swap that, because of an implicit subsidy 
by the government, turns out to be less costly than alternative sources 
of  finance. Thus debt-equity swaps will finance investment, but they 
finance at the budget cost of  a subsidy investment that would have 
taken place anyway. This explains the reluctance of  debtor countries 
to plunge into the scheme. 
Debt-equity swaps bring together, with the glue of budget pesos, two 
entirely  separate operations  that  would arise in a free, unregulated 
market. To solve the banks’ problems, marking to market of LDC debts 
would occur and hence debts could be sold to the nonbank public. To 
cope with the resource problem, debtor countries would  set up in- 
vestment funds in which nonresidents can invest in the private economy 
with liberal facility for repatriation of dividends. The two separate steps 
assure that old, bad debts do not prevent new investment. The bad 
debts are distributed more widely, though at a possible loss to all the 
banks’ stockholders. The debtor countries gain extra resources which 
they may use to expand investment or to buy back their debt, whichever 
appears more profitable. This is the market solution. Debt-equity swaps, 
by contrast, are a way of nationalizing the transaction, pushing budget 
subsidies to bank stockholders rather than to extra investment. 
Balance sheet tricks are not a substitute for gaining extra real re- 
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countries, increased private saving, increased efficiency in their public 
sector, and net resource transfers from abroad are the only way for 
investment and growth to return. Of  course, debtor countries should 
open all doors to foreign direct investment-the  sooner and wider, the 
better. But there is no justification for subsidizing such investment. 
3.6.3  Reversal of Capital Flight 
Wishful thinking turns to the $100 billion or more of Latin American 
assets that have fled from financial instability and taxation to the in- 
dustrial countries, especially the United States. Reversing these capital 
flights, primarily in the case of Mexico or Argentina, would make it 
almost possible to pay off  the external debt; much of  the debt was 
incurred in the first place to finance the exodus of private capital. 
Estimates of the amount of capital flight in the 1970s and early 1980s 
differ widely. But whatever the methods by which the magnitudes are 
estimated, the fact of at least a $100 billion capital flight from Latin 
America is not in question. Estimates are particularly large for Mexico, 
Argentina, and Venezuela and much smaller for Brazil and Chile. For 
both Argentina and Mexico, estimates of  $25 billion to $35 billion are 
not uncommon, hence the suggestion that reversing the mammoth out- 
flow could help pay off  the debt without tears. 
The idea that private capital could be the main solution, or at least 
provide an important contribution, is naive.  There is little historical 
precedent for a major reflow, and when it does happen it is the last 
wagon of the train. Einaudi once observed that savers “have the mem- 
ory of an elephant, the heart of a lamb, and the legs of a hare.” Capital 
will wait until the problems have been solved; it will not be part of the 
solution and is even less likely to provide a bridgehead.I5 
It is often argued that if only countries adopted policies guaranteeing 
savers a stable positive real rate of interest, there would be no capital 
flight problem. But that argument is not very realistic in three respects. 
First, in the context of adjustment programs, devaluation is often un- 
avoidable. Compensating savers for the loss they would have avoided 
by holding dollar assets would place a fantastic burden on the budget, 
which in turn would breed financial instability. Second, maintaining 
high real interest rates poses a serious risk to public finance. The public 
debt that carries these high real rates snowballs, and that in turn is a 
source of instability. Third, raising the return on paper assets above 
the prospective return on real capital is terrible supply-side economics; 
it ultimately erodes the tax base and deteriorates the financial system 
by  souring loans. A country in trouble simply cannot make its chief 
priority keeping the bondholders in place. 
Capital controls, where feasible, are a better strategy for restoring 
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while using extraordinarily high real interest rates. The latter strategy 
was, indeed, at the very source of the mess in Argentina under Martinez 
de Hoz and explains some of the difficulties in Mexico today. 
The capital flight problem is encouraged by the fact that the U.S. 
administration  no longer withholds taxes on nonresident assets. For 
with this tax-free  U.S. return, anyone investing in Mexico (and ac- 
tually paying taxes there) would need a yield differential, not counting 
exchange depreciation and  other risks,  of  several extra percentage 
points. 
There is much talk about the problems of banks putting in new money 
only to see it used by debtors such as Mexico to finance capital flight. 
Of an extra dollar of new money conceded by creditors, 70 cents are 
said to leave in extra capital flight. This indicates the need for a co- 
operative approach where  debtor-country governments,  the tax au- 
thorities in creditor countries, and the commercial banks cooperate in 
stopping capital flight and tax evasion. Of  course, none of  the three 
parties can succeed alone. 
3.6.4  The Facility 
A number of proposals have been made over the past four years by 
academics, business leaders, and politicians in an attempt to drive a 
wedge between old, bad debts and the recognized  need for new in- 
vestment in debtor countries. Old debts are seen in this context as 
oversized mortgages on the debtor countries that impede the free and 
voluntary flow of new funds. The means to achieve such a flow is a 
facility that buys up LDC debts from banks and reduces debt service 
costs for debtors.I6 Lightening the burden of  old debts and using an 
international fund with its diversification possibilities and possible credit 
standing provides important opportunities for passing on benefits to 
the debtors, without destructive effects on the solvency of banks or 
the asset position of their stockholders. 
The details of such facility schemes vary. Invariably they are ad- 
ministered by the World Bank and involve allusions to the Marshall 
Plan, recycling,  and  the  sharing of  international burdens  by  strong 
currency countries or countries with significant external surpluses. On 
the basis of a capital subscription to be made by an as yet undesignated 
donor, leveraged by significant borrowing in the world capital market, 
the facility would take LDC debts over from banks or buy these in the 
secondhand market. Benefits to the LDCs occur because the facility 
will have a lower cost of capital than the individual LDC, both because 
of diversification and guarantees. The benefit of the reduced cost of 
capital and of the facility’s purchases at discount of debts from banks 
would be passed on to debtors in the form of more favorable interest 
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The concept of a facility draws attention to an important practical 
problem  in  credit markets.  The higher the interest  rate  charged on 
credit, the less likely that it can and will be paid. Hence a policy of 
risk premiums is exactly that-it  makes loans risky. Thus the facility 
would avoid this problem by charging a common interest rate, but it 
would reward countries for performance by writing down outstanding 
debt. 
Such a facility would introduce a new party into debt negotiations. 
Concerned with the solvency and productivity of the facility, the man- 
agement  could take positions  on rescheduling  agreements to assure 
that the value of  the assets it carries is not impaired by extortionary 
settlements or unreasonable adjustment programs. One might imagine 
that the facility makes available a long-term reconstruction loan to a 
particular country, say Mexico, and in exchange secures from the banks 
extraordinary reductions in spreads or maturities. Of course, to perform 
this function aggressively would require that the manager of the facility 
have stature and independence beyond the immediate reach of the U.S. 
Treasury. 
The main question about the facility, the issue of the donor aside, is 
Who should be the beneficiaries? The facility must, ultimately, involve 
taxpayers’ money, although this may  occur in a highly remote, off- 
budget, and leveraged fashion. The use of taxpayers’ money makes it 
reasonable to ask whether the facility should benefit starving African 
debtors, middle-income Latin America,  or winners such  as Korea. 
Assigning the use of the fund primarily to Latin America rather than 
to Africa, whose debt is mainly to property authorities, is politically 
attractive. 
3.6.5  Debt Relief 
Debtor countries have failed to form an effective cartel that could im- 
posedebt reliefin theformofawrite-down, sharplyreducedinterest rates, 
generous grace periods, or  the consolidation of debt into perpetuities. On 
the contrary, debtor countries have competed with each other and, as a 
result, have wound up with poor terms and a short leash. 
So far, only two attempts have been made to turn debt service into 
a major political issue. One is the case of Peru, where the government 
unilaterally limited its debt service to a specified fraction of export 
revenue. The other is the Mexican case of  1986. In each instance the 
large domestic costs of  debt  service and the destructive effects on 
investment, inflation, and growth potential led the governments to try 
and limit the damage. It is hard to believe that Peru got very far, but 
it is certain that Mexico initiated an important change in policies and 
procedures. The Mexican success suggests to some observers that with 
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can in fact secure reduced spreads, contingency funds, and even an 
underwriting of growth. 
At the same time, the debt problem is starting to become a political 
issue. Henry Kissinger, Lord Lever, Sen. Bill Bradley, and an increas- 
ing number of policymakers  and policy economists are advocating a 
more political approach to the debt problem. This is the case in part 
for reasons of foreign policy. But poor U.S. trade performance is also 
starting to be seen as a reflection of  debtor countries’ need to earn 
foreign exchange for debt  service. This point  has been emphasized 
especially by Senator Bradley (1986a, 1986b). The Bradley debt plan 
accordingly  emphasizes the need  to create a  vehicle for trade-debt 
discussions. Focusing explicitly on the link between trade concessions 
by  debtor countries and targeted, limited debt relief,  this  approach 
consciously makes debt a political issue. Besides adapting the regu- 
latory system to facilitate write-downs agreed between  debtors and 
creditors, the proposal also calls for reduced interest payments, extra 
money, and debt write-downs. 
Several negative responses to the Bradley proposal have been voiced, 
suggesting that the plan is impractical or undesirable. One argument is 
that the particular details-for  example, the annual debt summit-are 
implausible, complicated, or useless. The trade issue, viewed from the 
perspective of the U.S.  external sector and growth, is small-there  has 
been only a $12-15  billion swing in the bilateral balance with South 
America. Moreover, the write-downs are felt to be insufficiently con- 
ditioned on performance of the debtor countries and hence not worth 
making. Another criticism is more basic. It amounts to the assertion 
that any and all kinds of debt relief reduce or even destroy the bene- 
ficiaries ultimate chances of renewed access to the international capital 
market. Countries that accept debt relief, it is argued, will be tainted. 
Only those that service humbly will see the day of  voluntary lending. 
Historical precedent for all of Latin America suggests the opposite. 
Political solutions to the debt problem are likely to be close to the 
arrangement Mexico secured and far away from the ambitious Bradley 
Plan. Resistance to write-downs might soften, even if  there is no in- 
dication of this at present, and terms might become more flexible. But 
even so the debt problem will remain an overwhelming burden on the 
growth prospects of  Latin America. Taxpayers are unwilling to under- 
write Latin American growth, and politicians are unwilling to under- 
write the banks.  Growth in  Latin America will therefore depend in 
equal parts on a solution to the U.S. deficit problem with generous 
monetary accommodation and on the introduction of reasonable public 
finance in the debtor countries. With these two conditions met, and 
excepting extreme episodes such as the 1986 Mexican oil decline, growth 
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Debt relief can come from direct government intervention, but it can 
also come if governments withdraw from organizing the debt collection 
process. Meltzer (1984) has advocated this course and Milton Friedman 
(1984, p. 38) has observed: “So I think the way you solve the LDC 
‘debt bomb’ problem is to require the people who make the loans to 
collect them. If they can, fine, and if they can’t, that’s their problem.” 
There is little doubt that a withdrawal of governments (and the IMF) 
from the debt collection process would lead to a rapid disintegration 
of the creditors’ cartel and a reduction of debts to levels more congenial 
to debtors. 
3.6.6  Moral Hazard 
Solutions to the debt crisis involving debt relief encounter one ap- 
parently overwhelming objection:  Latin America’s debt reflects to a 
large extent mismanagement and capital flight. Granting debt relief to 
Latin debtors, but not to countries where management was more care- 
ful, amounts to rewarding poor policy performance and thus invites 
repetition. 
But the moral hazard argument can also be made in two other ways. 
First, not giving debt relief means that the governments of  creditor 
countries enforce bad loans. They thus encourage poor lending policies 
on the part of commercial banks, which now expect their governments 
to help collect even the poorest sovereign loans. Second, in the context 
of capital flight it is frequently argued that amnesty for tax fraud and 
illegal capital transfers is an effective and desirable policy for encour- 
aging a reflow. Of course, the same moral hazard argument applies, as 
future tax morality would be undermined.  l7 
The major weakness of the moral hazard argument in cases such as 
Mexico and Argentina results from capital flight: those who pay are 
primarily workers whose real wages are cut. Owners of external assets 
are rewarded by capital gains and thus turn out to be net beneficiaries 
of the debt crisis. The moral hazard argument thus can be turned around 
to support the case for debt relief. 
Notes 
The author is indebted to Eliana Cardoso, Martin Feldstein, Stanley Fischer, 
and Simon Johnson for many helpful comments and suggestions. 
1. There is a lot of flux in debt data. A good survey of the problems can be 
found  in  Mills  1986.  We  use here the IMF data, data reported by  Morgan 
Guaranty World Financial  Markets, and the U.S. country exposure survey, 
except where otherwise noted. 
2.  The classification  of  countries follows the  IMF.  See  World Economic 
Outlook (October  1986): 31-34. 193  Our LDC Debts 
3. Note that real GDP and dollar GDP behave very differently.  A real de- 
preciation may raise real GDP but is certain to lower dollar GDP. 
4. This increase in real debt burdens would have outpaced any advantages 
from cumulatively lower interest rates on nondollar debt. As is well known, 
exchange rate movements  have far exceeded the depreciation  implicit in in- 
ternational interest differentials. 
5. See Dornbusch  1985 and 1986a on the Martinez de Hoz experiment. 
6. On the Chilean experiment, see Edwards and Edwards 1987, and Ramos 
7. On the Mexican case, see Cardoso and Levy 1986. 
8. See especially Fraga 1986 for a comparison between Germany in the 1920s 
and Brazil in the 1980s. See, too, Dornbusch 1985b. 
9. The fact that it is often food  subsidies that are eliminated,  without the 
proverbial neutral lumpsum tax to compensate the losers, does not  seem to 
limit the case for the policy recommendation. 
10. There are a few public  sector bonds outstanding.  Edwards 1986, and 
Dornbusch  1986b and  1986c look at the yields of Mexican, Argentine,  Vene- 
zuelan, and Brazilian bonds. 
11. The change in the bilateral trade balance in manufactures  is more sig- 
nificant than the change in the total bilateral trade balance because declining 
oil and commodity prices reduce our import bill and hence are reflected in a 
smaller change of the total balance. 
12. For an extensive discussion of  solutions, see Lessard and Williamson 
1985. 
13. The Mexican settlement forced the commercial banks to put up an un- 
expectedly large contribution.  The settlement has demonstrated that the debt 
problem is not dead, but also that government involvement might boomerang. 
14. For a strong statement of support for debt-equity swaps, see the Morgan 
Guaranty World Financial Markets issue of September 1986. 
15. The public opinion survey on Mexico reported in the New York Times 
on November 16, 1986, makes most apparent just how pessimistic nationals of 
debtor countries are about the chances of economic recovery. 
16. The most  recent proposals  are the editorial by David  Obey and  Paul 
Sarbanes in the New York Times, November 9, 1986, and the suggestion for a 
Japan Fund made in various speeches by Jim Robinson of American Express. 
17. There is an interesting difference in public finance ideology: government 
debt write-downs in the form of a capital levy are said to undermine the very 
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2. Thomas S. Johnson 
U.S. External Debt and LDC Debt: 
Twin Problems 
In  1982, when the international debt crisis burst  into our collective 
consciousness,  it  was  seen as a compartmentalized and  “compart- 
mentalizable”  problem. Indeed, the strategy for dealing with it under- 
scored that view.  Emphasis was on the individual debtors, and debt 
restructurings were negotiated  one at a time, each country  with its 
group of  creditor banks. Similarly, we handled the necessary macro- 
economic adjustments on a case-by-case basis, each country working 
out its reforms and adjustment policies with the International Monetary 
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It will be up to economic historians to decide whether the compart- 
mental approach was the correct one at the time-we  think it was the 
right approach. Whatever the final answer to that historical question, 
however,  today  the international debt problem  extends beyond the 
debtor countries and their creditor banks. 
Considerable progress has been made-from  both debtor and cred- 
itor perspectives-since  the summer of  1982. The “Baker group”  of 
fifteen countries-which  together owe about $460 billion of the $1 tril- 
lion of  LDC debt-have  moved, in the aggregate, from deep current 
account deficit much closer to balance. Moreover, prices for their ex- 
ports appear to have stabilized, interest rates on their debt have come 
down, and substantial debt restructuring has taken place. 
We  on the creditor side also have made progress. The five years since 
the problem became a crisis have allowed a substantial buildup of bank 
capital and reserves. As of late last year, lending exposure to the Baker- 
15 LDCs amounted to 125 percent of the capital of the nine largest 
U.S. banks, down from 200 percent in June 1982. 
While acknowledging this progress, many believe that we may have 
come as far as we can using the compartmental approach alone and 
that systemic reform may now be needed. We will undoubtedly continue 
to succeed in restructuring and extending existing credits, but  sub- 
stantial impediments lie in the way of providing the flow of new funds 
that the LDCs need in order to grow: 
0 Unceasing negotiations with individual debtor countries are draining 
the analytical and managerial resources of official institutions, private 
creditors, and the developing nations themselves. For example, the 
energy toll among the top managers in our industry is very costly, 
and it clearly impairs, to some extent, our ability to do other things. 
0 The case-by-case approach had considerable merit in the early stages 
of  the debt problem when adjustment was the priority. Now, when 
the emphasis has to shift to growth, reliance  on the case-by-case 
approach alone may actually be inhibiting development of broader 
solutions. 
Multilateral programs for LDC financing that have been proposed 
thus far, such as the Baker Plan, continue almost exclusive reliance 
on commercial bank lending. Given the cloud that hangs over the 
commercial banks for the exposures they already have, continued 
emphasis on bank lending may be unrealistic at best and dangerous 
to the viability of the system at worst. 
Beyond these institutional considerations,  however,  lie more fun- 
damental reasons why further progress is problematic without going 
well beyond the case-by-case restructuring pattern. The United States, 
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progress in the short run, but, in becoming the world’s largest debtor, 
in the longer run it has increased the vulnerability of the borrowing 
countries to shocks emanating from the industrialized world. 
Between 1982 and 1985, the United States accounted for 75 percent 
of the rise in industrialized countries’ total imports, and U.S. imports 
as a percentage of total world exports grew from 15 percent to more 
than 20 percent. Expansion of domestic demand in the United States 
has accounted disproportionately for expansion in worldwide demand 
and for growth of LDC exports. However, the unsustainability of U.S. 
consumer demand growth, complicated by  our dangerously growing 
external imbalances, now exposes the LDCs to persistent and desta- 
bilizing concern over the potential for a sudden worsening  of  their 
situation. 
How the industrialized world copes with its major imbalances will 
bear crucially on the ability of  the LDCs to emerge from their debt 
crisis. A sudden loss of confidence in the United States as a debtor, 
or simply a portfolio preference shift away from U.S. financial instru- 
ments, would  raise  dollar interest  rates  and  the  LDC  debt  service 
burden and at the same time slow or shut down growth in the United 
States-the  LDCs’ major market. 
However, a successful multilateral approach to the imbalances among 
industrialized nations would maintain demand for LDCs’ products and 
reduce the risks of  substantial increases in dollar interest rates. This 
is the challenge. 
The accumulation of the U.S.  debt in some ways is far more worrying 
and potentially  disruptive than the accumulation of  LDC debt. It is 
true that they differ in important ways. The U.S.  debt is far smaller 
when measured against our income and resources. Moreover, we owe 
the debt in our own currency, rather than in the creditor’s currency, 
so in that sense we can always repay. 
In another sense, however, the debts are disturbingly similar. In each 
case, the borrowing has postponed an essential adjustment of real living 
standards.  Borrowing in order to facilitate a more fundamental real 
adjustment is an appropriate use of credit for short periods of of time. 
But its use to avoid adjustment, as seen in the LDC experience, merely 
makes for a more wrenching adjustment eventually. Financial markets, 
of course, will ultimately cause the adjustments to occur, potentially 
in very destabilizing ways. 
I am not reassured by the progress to date in attacking the imbalances 
present in the industrialized world.  So far, there has been too much 
reliance on monetary policy in the coordination of  G-5 policies, and 
too little  movement  toward  correcting the saving-investment imbal- 
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The massive lending to the developing nations in the late 1970s oc- 
curred in an environment of excessive worldwide liquidity growth. In 
retrospect, this occurred in the mistaken belief that the labor markets 
and physical plant of the developed world offered substantial margins 
of excess capacity. 
Today, regulatory  changes and  sharp declines  in  nominal interest 
rates complicate interpretation of  money growth rates.  Nonetheless, 
there appears to be a similar complacency developing regarding the 
margins of unused  capacity.  There is no doubt in my  mind that the 
strong growth of U.S. demand, which has in major part benefited the 
LDCs,  has been  encouraged by  an accommodative U.S. monetary 
policy that may, with hindsight, prove to have been too easy. 
Meanwhile, the call for foreign monetary authorities to finance faster 
growth  ostensibly  to stimulate U.S. and  LDC export growth may 
amount, in effect, to a new way to monetize U.S.  deficits. Similarly, 
efforts by foreign policymakers to stabilize nominal foreign exchange 
rates against the dollar will tend to create a potentially dangerous ex- 
pansion of foreign money supplies. Such efforts already have entailed 
widespread acceleration of  monetary aggregates and, in some cases, 
unwelcome overshooting of monetary targets. Time will tell whether 
the enormous lending to the United States is being facilitated by excess 
liquidity creation, as was the LDC lending. The danger, of  course, is 
a new burst of inflationary pressures at some point. 
There seems to be widespread agreement among policymakers that 
the fundamental imbalances are found in differential saving and in- 
vestment patterns.  It is a familiar theme, expressed at the Plaza, in 
Tokyo and most recently in Paris. The United States must reduce its 
budget deficit and thereby its excessive demands on the world’s capital. 
The industrialized  countries having external surpluses must find an- 
other outlet for their excess saving. 
One way to effect these changes is identified in all of the G-5, G-6, 
and G-7 communiquks:  stimulating domestic demand in the surplus 
countries through more aggressive use of fiscal and tax policies. This 
can be supplemented by exploring mechanisms to channel capital to 
LDCs, a subject to which I will return. 
Before turning to some thoughts regarding an appropriate policy mix 
going forward, I must note that we are running out of time. While the 
LDC problem  grew over a long period  of  time, the door to credit 
availability closed suddenly in 1982. Such a dramatic event is probably 
not likely to confront the United States as a debtor. Since our debts 
are in dollars, they will always be repaid, though at what real value is 
unknown. But developments over the last year suggest to me the door 
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Through 1985, international investors appeared to view the United 
States as a good credit risk, given the size of  its economy and its 
productive resources. More recently, there have been ominous signs 
of a shift away from preference for U.S. investments, perhaps because 
U.S. monetary policy has been so accommodative. 
The middle two quarters of last year saw a sharp drop in spontaneous 
private inflows of  capital to the United States. In  1985, net private 
capital inflows ran at $103 billion, exceeding the total recorded inflows, 
as official capital  of  $8 billion  flowed out. In  the  second  and third 
quarters  of  1986, recorded  private net  capital inflows  slowed to an 
annual rate  of  $65 billion-barely  half  the total capital inflows-as 
official flows into the United States accelerated to nearly $60 billion. 
Even that rate of official inflow was probably  surpassed in the first 
quarter  of  1987. Meanwhile,  we  have witnessed  several worrisome 
episodes in the last twelve months in which the dollar’s foreign ex- 
change value has declined even as the U.S. interest rates have risen. 
In this context, the Paris G-6 agreement is meaningless if it does not 
deliver  substantial shifts in policies affecting fundamental saving-in- 
vestment balances.  The accord  so far has  apparently  succeeded  in 
relieving speculative pressures on the dollar, as currencies have traded 
in recent weeks over fairly narrow ranges. But the underlying market 
mood remains bearish, and a new speculative run-against  which the 
central banks would have little leverage-could  occur at any time. This 
makes it  all the more important that policymakers  move quickly to 
meet, or even exceed, the commitments they made to correct the sav- 
ing-investment imbalances. 
The litany  of  the required policy adjustment bears repeating:  the 
U.S. administration and Congress must not let up on their efforts to 
reduce the federal budget deficit. Significant progress has been made, 
but I sense that a level of  frustration is developing which threatens 
that progress. 
The discipline inherent in  Gramm-Rudman has put  a significantly 
declining budget deficit within our reach. Regardless of whether we 
meet the arbitrary timetable set forth in the act, the main objective has 
to be creating credible expectations of  declining budget deficits. The 
most important discipline has been resistance to any new programs. 
However, we now see our new programs-such  as catastrophic health 
insurance and welform reform-being  talked about, and it will require 
even greater efforts to hold the line. Budget deficit reduction in the 
United States will help maintain lower real U.S. interest rates and free 
up funds for productive private investment in the United  States and 
abroad. 
The surplus countries have taken some important steps and will have 
to continue their efforts to stimulate their domestic economies. My 201  Our LDC Debts 
sense is that still more can be done through tax incentives for invest- 
ment and local public works expenditures to replace export demand 
lost to the lower dollar. These initiatives, of  course, must take place 
while making every effort to keep markets open to international trade. 
We  can  add another  dimension  to these policies.  A  fundamental 
disequilibrium in the surplus industrialized countries is their excess of 
domestic savings. We  also know that the LDCs require more diversified 
credit sources and markets for their products. A result of better eco- 
nomic policy balance among the developed countries should be a mar- 
ginal, at least, improvement in the relative attractiveness of investments 
in the developing countries. 
This challenge-providing  a new flow of funds to promote growth- 
may require that we review the compartmental approach we have taken 
thus far on LDC debt. This debt is no longer a “bank” problem, and 
is too big for the banks to solve alone. The governments of the indus- 
trialized world, through excessive liquidity creation and mercantilist 
trade policies, helped create it, and governments must help solve it. 
The ultimate answer may  lie in  some form of multilateral lending 
institution created to channel new capital to these countries and assist 
in diversifying the risks and the investor base. New cash for additional 
lending could be raised  through  some combination of equity contri- 
butions  or credit guarantees from governments, together with more 
imaginative ways to deal with existing debt. The emphasis of the new 
approach, to which the creditor banks ought also to contribute, should 
be on new funds in response to longer-term economic reforms in the 
debtor nations. 
The alternative-relying  solely on case-by-case restructuring of ex- 
isting debts-may  not provide enough flexibility and time for the re- 
forms to produce sustainably better performance in these countries. 
What we and they need now is breathing room. 
Ideas of this sort require much more work. However, I am convinced 
that the problems confronting the LDCs and those of the industrialized 
world are really the same problems. They must be solved together, if 
they are to be solved at all. 
3. Anne 0.  Krueger 
The Problems of  the LDCs’ Debt 
Debt-servicing difficulties are not a new phenomenon. American eco- 
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and even in the “golden era” after the Second World War reschedulings 
often accompanied IMF stabilization programs. Until the 1980s, how- 
ever, debt-servicing difficulties and reschedulings were seldom noted 
outside  of  the international  institutions  and  country  in  which  they 
happened. 
In the 1980s, a number of large developing countries, with sufficiently 
sizable debt to arouse concern for the macroeconomic stability of the 
international financial system, encountered debt-servicing difficulties 
at almost the same time. Because these difficulties were simultaneous, 
it was natural that many observers took debt to be the problem, rather 
than a symptom. Indeed, there were perceived to be  (at least) two 
problems:  one, the financial institutions in credit countries, and the 
other the heavily indebted developing countries. While the two prob- 
lems are not identical, it is clear that if the borrowers succeed in serv- 
icing their debt and restoring growth, both problems will be solved. I, 
therefore,  concentrate  on this  issue  in  most of  my  remarks.  In the 
conclusion, I briefly address the question of what might happen if there 
were an alternative outcome. 
Almost any country confronted with debt-servicing difficulties has, 
by  definition, a “balance  of payments crisis.”  If it could service its 
debt, it could also obtain financing for its current obligations on inter- 
national capital markets. This does not mean that debt-servicing ob- 
ligations “caused” the balance of payments crisis; on the contrary, the 
usual story is one of chronic current account deficits that are financed 
by borrowing until creditors are unwilling to extend additional credit. 
It is not the existence of  debt per se that triggers a crisis, but rather 
the inability to command yet  more loans.  However, in  1982-83  the 
world recognized the “crisis,”  but failed to appreciate the nature of 
the longer-term problems that had led to it. 
For this reason, any assessment of the problems associated with the 
debt of individual developing countries must start with an understand- 
ing of the origins of the difficulties. I, therefore, address that question 
first. Thereafter, individual countries’ prospects for resolution of their 
particular problems, given the current outlook for the global economy, 
are analyzed. On that basis, it is possible to evaluate potential changes 
in the international environment that might enhance economic pros- 
pects for some of  the heavily indebted  countries and for the world 
economy, which is the final topic. 
What Led to the Debt Problem? 
It is useful to recall the textbook explanation of capital flows, which 
for present purposes I shall equate with accumulation of debt. Capital- 
rich countries have relatively high savings rates (because of their high 
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with capital-poor, developing countries. Therefore, capital should flow 
from rich countries to poor countries because savers will receive higher 
returns and world economic growth will be enhanced. 
During the  1970s, most observers viewed the expansion of  private 
lending to developing countries as a sign of success with development: 
LDCs that had earlier been dependent on official capital flows (foreign 
aid and lending from government agencies and the multilateral devel- 
opment banks) were able to borrow from the private international cap- 
ital market. That appeared to confirm the conventional wisdom and to 
signal that the private international capital market was functioning well 
in allocating the world’s savings to high-return activities. Then came 
the “debt crisis” of the 1980s, which led some to question the textbook 
wisdom. 
The conventional analysis is not wrong, but it is surely incomplete, 
at least as stated above. Borrowing to finance high rate-of-return in- 
vestments can certainly yield a sufficient increment to income to permit 
the borrower to  service the  debt  and  simultaneously  earn a  higher 
income. But borrowing to finance an excess of  consumption over in- 
come cannot be continued indefinitely. And, of course, investors’ ex- 
pectations may be wrong, either with regard to the stream of returns 
they will earn or with respect to the expected real interest rate they 
will pay over the life of their loan. 
What happened in the 1970s was a combination of many things. Some 
countries’ economic policies were conducive to high rates of return on 
investment, and they borrowed much as in  the textbook story. Even 
those countries had to adjust in the early 1980s to worldwide recession 
and much higher real interest rates, but they were by and large able 
to do so, albeit not without difficulty. 
Other countries, however, had macroeconomic policy stances in which 
domestic investment (some of which yielded low real returns) exceeded 
domestic saving, and foreign borrowing  financed the difference. To 
some extent, the excess of domestic investment was the result of large 
public sector deficits (even when the authorities raised domestic in- 
terest rates to encourage the private sector to do the foreign borrowing); 
another contributing factor was the failure by some countries to have 
adjusted domestic incentives after the oil price increase in  1973. In a 
very permissive international environment, with negative real rates of 
interest and rising nominal export prices, these policy stances were 
not inconsistent with some growth of real per capita incomes and con- 
tinued debt servicing, although alternative policies would have yielded 
even more rapid, and certainly more sustainable, growth. When the 
global environment changed in  the early  1980s, however, these coun- 
tries were confronted with major debt-servicing difficulties, and the 
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no longer adequate to the task. To  compound  matters, there was a 
required adjustment to the almost-simultaneous  sharp rise in real in- 
terest  rates,  deteriorating terms of  trade, and decline in  net  capital 
flows. 
Other countries fared even worse: their macroeconomic policies were 
so unrealistic that they were unable to sustain growth even in the 1970s. 
In some instances, there were debt crises and sharp shifts in policies 
even before  the  1980s. Turkey is the most  visible case. Many  sub- 
Saharan African countries, of course, also experienced negative rates 
of growth of per capita income in the 1970s. However, a large portion 
of their debt was on concessional terms, and aid was sufficiently large 
so that many did not confront unmanageable debt-servicing difficulties 
until the 1980s. Then the impact of the altered global environment was 
magnified by the accumulated inefficiencies resulting from past policies. 
To be sure, not all countries fell into any of these three categories. 
Some, most notably the South Asian countries, were sufficiently fiscally 
conservative that they did not borrow much from the private capital 
markets in the  1970s. Their situation is, therefore, not considered in 
what follows, although the fact that some low-income countries are not 
heavily indebted must be borne in the mind when considering policy 
options for improving the prospects of the heavily indebted countries. 
The precise mix of internal and external factors that resulted in debt- 
servicing problems  varied  significantly from country to country.  No 
one diagnosis pertains to all, or even the majority of  countries. None- 
theless, all of the heavily indebted  countries that encountered debt- 
servicing difficulties are confronted with a much harsher international 
economic environment in the 1980s: they cannot base their policies on 
the expectation that there will be a return to the conditions of the 1970s. 
This means that policies must be changed, not only or even primarily 
because of  the need to service and perhaps reduce debt, but  simply 
because the policies that were at least marginally sustainable through- 
out the 1970s are not feasible in the mid-1980s. New capital inflows, if 
and when  they  take  place,  will  be  economically  warranted  only in 
financing more efficient investment programs than was the case in the 
1970s. Even without  debt, therefore,  policy shifts would have been 
necessary  and  economic prospects  would have  deteriorated  for the 
~~ 
heavily indebted developing countries under their policy regimes of the 
1970s. 
Prospects for Growth and Creditworthiness 
Resumption/acceleration of economic growth is an important objec- 
tive, not only for the well-being of people in developing countries, but 
also for American political and economic interests. It is difficult to 
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longer-term with stagnant or falling living standards in the heavily in- 
debted countries. At any event, it is highly doubtful if  exports could 
be increased enough to maintain debt service without growth in real 
output. Thus, while growth is desirable in itself, it is also a prerequisite 
for resolution of  the debt problem. 
The fundamental questions, in my judgment, are (1) What rates of 
economic growth would be attainable in the absence of any debt given 
a global environment not too different from that prevailing during the 
past  several years? (2) To  what extent do debt-servicing obligations 
reduce the attainable growth rate? and (3) What conflict is there, if any, 
between acceleration of growth and ability to maintain debt-servicing 
obligations and restore creditworthiness?  Much public  (and profes- 
sional) discussion of the debt problem has been muddled by confusion 
of these questions. 
The attainable rate of  economic growth of  any country, given the 
global environment, is a function of its resource endowment, the rate 
at which it is accumulating resources, its policy stance (which is crucial 
in determining the efficiency with which resources are used and also 
the rate of  saving and resource accumulation), and its willingness to 
alter its policies to improve growth prospects. 
With a few exceptions, the policy reforms undertaken to date have 
been demonstrably inadequate to the task.  In most heavily indebted 
developing countries, one would make similar policy prescriptions to 
enhance  prospects  for  resuming/accelerating  growth:  adoption  and 
maintenance of a realistic exchange rate; dismantling quantitative con- 
trols over imports and reducing the bias of  the trade regime against 
exports by sharply reducing protection conferred to import-substituting 
industries and imposing a low ceiling on the height of  any remaining 
tariffs; reduction in the size of the public sector deficit (but with ap- 
propriate attention to the investmentkonsumption composition of pub- 
lic expenditures and the incentive effects of the tax structure); removal 
of many domestic controls over private economic activity; reduction 
in the inefficiencies associated with parastatals; and movement toward 
more efficient mechanisms for channeling credit to its most productive 
uses. 
If  “ideal”  or “near-ideal’’  reforms could  be achieved,  improved 
resource reallocation, increased inefficiency of resource utilization, and 
faster rates of  growth of  savings and investment would all conduce 
toward higher growth rates. Initially, one would anticipate a burst of 
exports and some degree of rationalization, if not reduction, in the size 
of the import-competing sector. Simply because incentives have been 
so distorted toward import-competing activities, the shift in incentives 
under this “ideal” reform would result in a period during which export 
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to a more  appropriate level, and one would  expect new private in- 
vestment to be heavily oriented toward exportables and public invest- 
ment to expansion of ports, communications, and other essential sup- 
port services for expansion of international trade. 
While the growth rate that might be achieved with such a shift in the 
policy environment would naturally vary from country to country, the 
historical  evidence is that even during times of  slow growth of  the 
world economy, countries with reasonable policy environments have 
been able to achieve growth rates of  6-7  percent. If  a country could 
somehow get to the 6-7  percent growth rate path, with an even more 
rapid rate of growth of export earnings for a half decade or so, debt- 
servicing problems would become manageable and diminish in impor- 
tance with time. 
There are, however, two reasons why things are not so easy as that 
even from the individual country’s viewpoint (I later address the global 
issue of protectionism and what it does to export prospects). The first 
is that many countries’ reform efforts have generally fallen far short 
of  “ideal”; the second is that, in some countries, debt-servicing obli- 
gations may make the attainable rate of growth significantly lower than 
6-7  percent without some capital idow  to supplement  domestic savings. 
Turning to the first issue, the needed “ideal”  reforms are politically 
painful. Inevitably, the political process generates pressures to reduce 
the extent of reforms to the “necessary minimum.” While economists 
can, to a considerable extent, identify larger and smaller deviations of 
policy from those most conducive to growth, it is not yet possible, 
given the state of the art, to quantify the essential minimum that will 
be effective in, for example, stopping a decline in per capita income 
or in permitting a growth rate of x percent per capita per annum, quite 
aside from the fact that any such quantification would necessarily be 
conditioned on the state of the international economy. Some “reform” 
programs, when whittled down by the political process, might succeed, 
if at all, only under highly favorable assumptions. 
In these circumstances, many reform programs appear to be  “too 
little, too late.”  And in some instances they are. Even in prospect, it 
was hard to understand how the international community gave its bless- 
ing to some of the programs; in many other instances, it could readily 
be judged that prospects were at best doubtful. To be sure, had global 
conditions returned to those prevailing in the mid-l970s, some of these 
programs would have been sufficient. But absent such conditions, it is 
almost certain that further policy reform programs will be essential in 
many of the heavily indebted countries. 
Undertaking halfhearted and ill-fated reform programs has a number 
of costs. Political opposition (in other countries and in later efforts in 
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argument against other attempts. And to the extent that international 
resources for supporting reform efforts are limited, the support of these 
programs diverts resources from more thoroughgoing efforts with far 
greater likelihood of success. Finally, there is some evidence that po- 
tential lenders cannot discriminate among reform programs: the failure 
of any makes them more reluctant to support all others without dis- 
crimination among them. 
Thus, any attempt to evaluate prospects for growth and resolution 
of the debt problem must start with an assessment of the adequacy of 
the reforms  undertaken thus far relative  to the magnitude of  those 
needed. I have already  said enough  to suggest that  I  am, in  many 
instances, skeptical of the adequacy of the programs. But so far I have 
assumed there  is  no debt problem,  only an international economic 
environment less permissive of  policy mistakes than was that of  the 
1970s. The question next arises as to how the existence of debt and 
debt-servicing obligations complicates the analysis. 
In most countries, the necessity for debt servicing creates a signif- 
icant  cost in  that  it diverts the attention of  some of  the most able 
policymakers from longer-term issues to the short-term problem of debt 
servicing and rescheduling. This “crisis management” mentality is not 
conducive to longer-term economic reforms, and it is all too easy to 
think of debt as the sole cause of difficulties. Ability to blame the debt 
also helps increase opposition to the necessary longer-term reforms. 
Aside from that very real, but unmeasurable, cost, debt servicing 
poses two problems: (1) generating the foreign exchange for debt ser- 
vice, and (2) obtaining the necessary finance (since in most countries 
the debt is largely a government obligation). 
For many countries, these problems would reduce the rate of growth 
attainable from “ideal,”  or even realistic, reforms. Nonetheless, the 
arithmetic is such that in most cases, attaining sufficient policy reform 
is  the problem:  export and GNP growth would and could be  rapid 
enough to permit a fairly rapid reduction in debt-service ratios, with a 
consequent diminution of the debt problem. 
There are some countries, however, whose debt obligations are so 
large, and whose incomes are so low, that it is difficult to imagine (on 
reasonable assumptions about the world environment) that even ideal 
reforms could deliver quick results without  some additional external 
capital. New investment is usually needed to permit more than a short- 
term response out of excess capacity to newly realigned incentives. In 
countries where the domestic savings rate (public and private) is 12- 
14 percent of  GNP, it is almost inconceivable that debt-servicing ob- 
ligations (which usually have to be financed out of public revenues) of 
6-7  percent of  GNP can be met while simultaneously increasing net 
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able rate of growth of exports and efficient import substitutes. If there 
were  no “debt  overhang,”  the high  rates of  return associated  with 
realigned incentives would induce voluntary private capital flows. While 
an improved environment for direct private investment and other, non- 
debt, private  capital flows can  perhaps  increase  capital  inflows (or 
reduce outflows) to some extent, it is highly unlikely that the order of 
magnitude can be sufficient to improve prospects  significantly, given 
the reluctance of lenders to increase their exposure in  countries en- 
countering debt-servicing difficulties. And, until growth resumes, it is 
doubtful whether countries’ prospects will appear sufficiently favorable 
to induce private lending from abroad. There thus may be a vicious 
circle in which the failure of capital inflows implies low growth which 
implies future debt-servicing difficulties. 
This “debt overhang” problem is well known in the corporate finance 
literature: a burden of debt from past investments can act as a “tax” 
on future earnings so that even if  companies have high  prospective 
rates of  return on new investments they may be unable to raise the 
finance for them (although it must be pointed out that holders of equity 
may have incentives to invest in some highly risky ventures even with 
negative expected returns since unfavorable outcomes cannot make 
their situations worse). Although a need to raise revenue for debt ser- 
vice equal to 5,6,  or 7 percent of GNP does not at first sight seem that 
high, it can be formidable when viewed in the context of economies 
where per capita incomes are very low and where there is an imperative 
to reduce the size and disincentive effects of the public sector. 
The problem posed to policymakers by the debt (quite aside from 
whether the costs of reform may be high enough to be politically des- 
tabilizing) is to differentiate between cases of insufficient reforms, when 
prospects for growth and resumption  of creditworthiness are in any 
event bleak (and where, therefore, additional debt will only make the 
problem worse when an adequate program is finally undertaken), and 
cases of  “debt  overhang”  where reforms have been  sufficiently far 
reaching but are unlikely to succeed because of  the burden of  debt 
service. 
Based on these considerations, it is simple to answer the third ques- 
tion I posed. Except in cases of debt overhang, there is little, if  any, 
conflict between resumption/acceleration of growth and resolution of 
the debt problem. To be sure, adequate reforms would yield even higher 
benefits in  the absence of  debt, but attainment of  sufficient growth 
would surely permit the resumption of voluntary lending and thus re- 
duce the drag. Indeed, it can be argued that the pressures created by 
debt-servicing obligations may, in some circumstances, induce more 
sizable reforms than would otherwise be undertaken and in that sense 
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That much said, however, the magnitude of policy reform required 
with debt service to achieve any  “target”  growth rate is certainly 
greater than it would be in the absence of debt. When there are political 
constraints on how much can be done, there may indeed be instances 
where the existence of debt-servicing obligations constitutes the critical 
margin of drain on resources. Nonetheless, in the longer term it remains 
true that the policy efforts that would accelerate growth are the same 
ones that would ease debt-servicing problems. 
The Global Environment 
Despite the feasibility of  resuming  satisfactory growth and of  re- 
solving the debt problem, the outlook that it will happen is not bright. 
Many countries’ governments have undertaken what can at best be 
described as partial reform programs, and there are signs of political 
difficulties even then. Even in some of those countries where the policy 
package appears to be fairly far reaching, the ‘‘debt overhang” appears 
to be an issue. 
At best, under present conditions, those few countries with the po- 
litical strength to undertake sufficient reforms will accelerate growth 
and restore creditworthiness,  or at least  service their debt without 
major difficulties. Most of the heavily indebted countries, however, are 
more likely in the near term to suffer low growth and continuing debt 
service problems. In the longer term, of course, it is almost unthinkable 
that political stability could be maintained with stagnant or declining 
per capita incomes and continued voluntary debt servicing. But for the 
next three to five years, it is likely that there will be slow growth, with 
recurring  suspensions of  payments  and protracted  negotiations  and 
reschedulings, with different countries taking center stage at different 
times. Of course, there will likely be a few lasting success stones, but 
they will be the exception unless something in the global environment 
changes. 
The analysis thus far has been based on the assumption that world 
economic prospects are for a continuation of conditions much as they 
were in 1985-86:  annual OECD growth of between 2.5 percent and 3 
percent; growth of world trade about 5 percent; little new private lend- 
ing to the heavily indebted countries except in support of reschedulings; 
and concessional flows to the very poor countries, especially sub-Sa- 
haran Africa, at approximately present levels. 
Even this rather unsatisfactory outlook is premised on the contin- 
uation of existing growth rates of  world trade.  Existing protectionist 
pressures against developing countries’ exports are worrisome not only 
for the long-run damage they could do to the economies of  the pro- 
tectionist countries but also because any significant effective increase 
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the developing countries.  Should the OECD, for example, limit the 
growth of exports from developing countries to the present share of 
OECD markets, that would imply expansion of LDC exports in the 
aggregate at a real average annual rate of 3 percent. Developing coun- 
tries as a group could not then experience sufficiently satisfactory rates 
of  export growth to finance both  debt  servicing and  the growth of 
imports that would permit realization of satisfactory growth (and such 
protection would, in  any event, provide further ammunition for the 
foes of policy reform in the developing countries). 
Although the link between the Uruquay round of trade negotiations 
and the developing countries’ prospects may seem remote, it is in fact 
very close: the restoration and maintenance of a liberalized trading 
regime is perhaps the single most important policy imperative from the 
developing countries’ viewpoint. Recognizing that, more rapid growth 
of  the OECD would also improve the odds. While maintenance of a 
liberalized trading regime would in any event be a necessary condition 
for sustained OECD growth, there is good reason to believe that some- 
thing in  the neighborhood of 3 percent OECD growth may be a wa- 
tershed: historically, world trade had grown at about 1.5 times the rate 
of growth of the OECD GNP; developing countries have been able to 
increase their shares in trade, with growth rates about half as much 
again. On these norms (which presume no increase in protectionism), 
a 2.5 percent OECD growth rate would witness a 4  percent real rate 
of growth of world trade, which in turn could support about a 6 percent 
growth rate of developing countries’ exports. That is barely above the 
real rate of  interest; in these circumstances, the prospects for many 
developing countries would be poor indeed. By  contrast, 3.5 percent 
OECD growth would probably permit about a 7.5 percent growth rate 
for developing countries’ exports; this would provide a small margin 
for error and still permit  some reduction in the overall debt service 
ratio for developing countries. To  compound matters further, a lower 
rate of  OECD growth would very likely be associated with a higher 
real rate of interest. 
But while the world economy is important for the prospects of de- 
veloping countries, the fate of issues that need to be addressed to assure 
more rapid growth will depend on political imperatives within the OECD 
countries and not on considerations of  the debt problem or of  devel- 
oping countries’ interests. The question, then, is whether other changes 
might improve prospects. 
The obvious prescription is to increase capital flows, especially to 
those countries where policy reform appears to be reasonably far reach- 
ing and where debt overhang seems to be a significant issue. This would 
be  doubly  attractive. It  would  improve the long-term prospects  for 
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savings to support a rate of  investment that would allow a realistic 
change for growth. It would also increase the attractiveness of  suffi- 
ciently bold policy changes in other countries to increase the likelihood 
that policy changes would in fact accomplish their intended goals. 
To  date, there has been insufficient differentiation between degrees 
of  reform effort, and the developed countries and international insti- 
tutions have fairly evenhandedly supported efforts in countries without 
as much regard to the adeququacy of reforms as might have been desir- 
able. In part, this has been because assessment of what is adequate 
depends on one’s forecast of future global conditions and other un- 
certainties.  In part, however, political pressures have supported rel- 
atively uniform, and somewhat uncritical, reform efforts. 
To be sure, augmented capital flows to the heavily indebted countries 
would reduce the needed degree of reform. But barring a large increase 
in capital flows, the case for greater targeting of available resources to 
those countries having undertaken adequate programs would appear 
very strong. 
Some greater degree of  concentration  of  limited resources  would 
surely increase the rate of return on capital flows to developing coun- 
tries. Assurances of support for a period of several years for, say, trade 
liberalization would provide needed  credibility to reform efforts and 
often the critical margin between success and failure. Especially since 
more  resources  may otherwise result  in  less reform, the case for a 
highly selective targeting of available resources to the most thorough- 
going policy reform efforts seems very strong. 
While it would require concerted action of the major OECD coun- 
tries, such support could come through a special window of the IMF 
or World Bank, with eligibility limited to countries meeting reasonably 
stringent criteria. For example, countries might be eligible only if they 
undertook to maintain a policy regime with no quantitative restrictions 
on imports; no tariffs higher than, say, 10 percent; automatic adjust- 
ments  in  the exchange rate whenever  the  current account or trade 
balance deficit exceeded a certain figure (perhaps set as a percentage 
of  GNP); no controls over domestic prices; a public sector deficit of 
less than 2 percent of GNP; and a real rate of return to domestic savers 
in excess of 3 percent. Whether additional requirements should be made 
judgmentally or not could be the subject for discussion, but my pre- 
deliction would be for reasonably tight automatic criteria so that po- 
litical considerations not come into play.  In saying this, I recognize 
that there are ways of  “cooking the books”  on the size of the public 
sector deficit, the tarif€ rate, and so on. Nonetheless, reasonably “clean” 
guidelines would provide support for those administering the window 
and simultaneously permit negotiation over the degree to which the 
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What would induce countries to continue to adhere to the terms of 
the window and not reverse their reforms after a year  or two? Ob- 
viously, there are no guarantees, but there could be a few inducements: 
(1) the assurance of  support for the current account deficit up to the 
specified level; and (2) a negotiated debt repayment schedule that was 
annually effective contingent on satisfactory performance as agreed. 
Such a facility, if it had adequate resources to underwrite thorough- 
going reform efforts of this nature, would do several things: (1  ) it would 
substantially increase the probability that reforms would be sustained 
and therefore would be effective, especially since a lack of credibility 
has often been a major reason for slow responses to altered incentives; 
and (2) it would probably increase the number of political leaderships 
willing to undertake policy reform packages of  adequate proportions 
to induce results. 
One fears, however, that the status quo-slow  growth and recurring 
debt-servicing  difficulties followed by  new reschedulings-will  con- 
tinue to be the order of the day unless  a major disaster focuses the 
attention of the international community on the problem or worldwide 
economic conditions revert to those prevailing in the mid-1970s. Given 
the enormous costs that would be associated with either of those out- 
comes, one can only hope that a buoyant international economy and 
a successful Uruquay round make a sufficient difference so that more 
countries can, more quickly, escape from their present difficulties. 
Summary of  Discussion 
A major part of the discussion centered around the role of conditionality 
in solutions to the debt problem. Anne Krueger suggested that given 
the stop-and-go history of the policy reform apparatus in Latin Amer- 
ica, the international community should assume the support of correct 
policy over the long horizon, laying down conditions in advance so 
that rollover can happen automatically. The problems should be han- 
dled in a more global and less case-by-case manner, and the political 
interests of the major banklfund shareholders should be kept out of the 
process. The rules should be more clean. 
Krueger contended that the Bradley plan did not recognize the scar- 
city of  resources and the resulting fact that they should be carefully 
aimed.  International  competition for  resources  would  increase  the 
chances of  successful policy reform. Currently the fund and bank re- 
sources are spread with  insufficient selectivity  to all countries  that 
undertake any kind of reform. More resources are indeed needed, but 
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Thomas Johnson agreed that any new institution to deal with the 
debt problem should get the rewards on the table ahead of the policy 
reform itself. From this perspective, he argued, an institution that buys 
debt from the banks, as in Bradley, could be counterproductive. Strict 
discipline with new credit over time could be quite effective. 
Rudiger Dornbusch argued on the basis of a reading of Bradley’s 
actual proposals that in the Bradley Plan a rolling revision of condi- 
tionality is matched  to write-downs  of debt and trade credit. Trade 
liberalization and other reforms are required. The problem with this 
plan for some is that the banks have to bear some of the burden. He 
warned that Congress is rampant with plans that would result in the 
reduction of stockholder equity. 
Johnson agreed that the correct words about conditionality are there 
but asserted that the institutional setting is lacking. 
The discussion shifted to the question of what might happen in the 
absence of  a major new multilateral initiative.  Johnson made a dis- 
tinction between relief and write-down of  debts. The marketplace is 
already doing the bookkeeping on the value of the loans, although there 
has been no forgiveness or write-downs by the banks. He raised the 
possibility of the banks walking away from the situation in 1989 or 1990, 
after they  have increased reserves enough  so that there  will  be no 
leverage over them, and argued that this scenario without a setting for 
new financing for the LDCs would be the worst possible outcome. 
Martin.Feldstein turned the issue around, asking why the big three 
debtors would not default, since they will not get as much in new loans 
as they have to pay in interest. He noted that the threat of  exclusion 
from world trade might be credible. Krueger recalled the “dollar short- 
age,” the Club of Rome predictions, and the “energy shortage.” When 
the U.S.  budget deficit shrinks, she contended, capital will flow to poor 
countries. The only hope for growth for debtor nations is integration 
into the world economy, and since trade credits will be the first to go, 
the debtor countries will hang on until they lose these credits. John 
Block wondered if the debtors could not improve their credit rating by 
walking out on their current obligations, which have such a depressing 
effect on prospects  for growth.  Krueger maintained  that the funda- 
mental determinants of growth would be the same. 
Differences between the banks will not cause the situation to unravel, 
contended Johnson, who believes that the stakes are too big for the 
situation to fall apart. 
The issue of  book-market discounts was raised by  several partici- 
pants. Johnson pointed out that this market is highly illiquid. He ex- 
plained that U.S. banks do not reflect market discounts but believes 
that there is room for growth to resume if imbalances in Western nations 
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for LDC market is small, primarily used for debt-equity swaps, and 
should therefore not be considered a bellwether. 
Thomas Enders pointed out that European banks have provisioned 
for much of their Latin American debtor portfolio, since their reserves 
are above the discounted value of the debt, and are moving it off their 
balance sheet. The Japanese may be doing the same thing, implying 
that U.S. banks would be the major holders as banks of LDC debt. 
U.S.  banks have increased capital set-asides, but the recent drop in 
the LDC debt as percentage of equity from 90 percent to 45 percent 
masks an uneven distribution of  debt, with the money center banks 
more exposed. Still, no U.S. banks are writing anything off. 
Johnson agreed that the problem of the bank balance sheets is sec- 
ondary to the question of how to deal with policy reform and growth, 
and how to maximize the likelihood that nations can play their financial 
and trading role in the world community. 